Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

R. Verne McCullough v. The Board of
Commissioners of the State of Utah: Brief of
Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Elias Hansen; Henry D. Moyle; Clifford L. Ashton; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Unknown.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, McCullough v. Board of Commissioners, No. 6101.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/37

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DCCUME NT
KF 1J

45.9
.59

DOCKET NO.

UTAH SUPR;::ME COURT

f2RIEF

INDEX
Page
ABSTRACT OF TESTIMONY
NO. !-Subdivisions (d), (e) and (f) ..........................................................
Subdivision (d)- W underli
Fritz Wunderli (prosecution) .......................................................... 2
Blanche Wunderli (prosecution) .................................................... 6
R. Verne McCullough (defense) ............................................. 8 and 60
Subdivision (e)-Woodland
W. T. Woodland (prosecution) .................................................... 9
Mrs. Lydia Woodland (prosecution) ............................................ 15
R. Verne McCullough (defense) .......................................... 18 and 60
Subdivision (f)-York
Clarence York (prosecution) ............................................................ 19
Soren C. Christensen (defense) ...................................................... 23
Louise Erickson (defense) ................................................................ 28
Shirley Erickson (defense) ................................................................ 31
R. Verne McCullou~h (defense) ....................................... .34 and 60
Oren M. Swenson (prosecution) .................................................... 37
NO. Il-Subdivision (g) .................................................................................. 46
Homer E. Grove (prosecution) ...................................................... 46
Gerald Blake (prosecution) .............................................................. 48
Ellis J. Pickett (prosecution) .......................................................... 50
Ben Lingenfelter (defense) ................................................................ 52
R. Verne McCullough (defense) ....................................... .56 and 60
L. 0. Thomas. Subd. (d), (e), (f) and (g) (prosecution) ............ 63
NO. III-Subdivisions (I) and (m) In Re Harry E. Erickson ................ 63
R. Verne McCullough ................................................................................ 65
STATEMENT OF LAW AND ARGUMENT
Statement of Law and Argument .................................................................. 83
Quantum of Proof Necessary in Disbarment Proceedings ........................ 83
Division I (d), (e) and (f) ............................................................................ 83
Time within which Proceedings Must be Instituted ...................................... 84
No Evidence in Record to Show McCullough Solicited
Employment through Sid Spencer .......................................................... 86
ByA. Direct Agency .............................................................................. 88
B. Implied Agency or Agency by Ratification ............................ 91
C. Theory of Conspiracy ................................................................ 101
Division Il-Soliciting from Katherine Sutfin (g) ........................................ 106
Division III-Subds. (I) and (m), In Re Harry E. Erickson .................. 109
Contempt Proceedings a Nullity ...................................................................... 125
Committing Magistrate No Power to Fine and Imprison for ContempL ..130
Perjury Cannot be Committed before Court without Jurisdiction ............ 134
Affidavit Must State Positive Averment of Facts for Court to Have
Jurisdiction .................................................................................................... 136
Affidavit on Information and Belief Cannot Give Court Jurisdiction ...... 139
Committing Magistrate Bound by Law to Dismiss Prosecution When
Prosecutor Moved to Dismiss for Lack of Evidence ........................ 143
AUTHORITIES CITED
In Re Evans and Rogers (1st case) 22 Utah 367 ........................................ 83
People vs. Tanquary, 48 Colo. 124. 109 Pac. 260 .................................. 84-85
In Re Alameda Co. Bas Assn. (Calif.), 170 Pac. 432 ............................ 84-124
Thornton's Attorneys at Law,
pages 1307, 1309, 1299, 1306, 214, 221 ...................... 84, 85, 86, 114, 116
In Re Haymond. (Calif.) 53 Pac. 809 ............................................................ 84
5 American Juris. 434 ........................................................................................ 85

INDEX-Continued
Page
9

~5 ~- t ~. ~ ~ 8) --~-=~--~~ _ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ~~

~t~:~~\::~~~!6 ?5--M~.--P.-p;;.--589--:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ~~

People vs. Allison, 68 Ill. 151 --------------------------------------------------------------------85, 86

~ ~: ~-6~~~i~o~e3T6~~l

~~

}.
___ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
In Re Richardson, (Calif.) 288 Pac. 669 -----------------------------------·------------------ 87
In Re Evans (2nd case), 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac. 217 -------------------------------- 87
In Re Sizer, (Mo.) 267 S. W. 922 ----------------------------------------------------------87, 93
Jones, Com. on Evidence, Vol. II, Sec. 944, p. 1741 ---------------------------------- 90
(Vol. II, Sec. 945, p. 1745-8) Vol. II, Sec. 943, p. 1740 ______________ 90-101
2 American Juris., pp. 236, p. 190 (Sec. 220, p. 175) ------------------------99-100
Crites vs. St. Paul Ins. Co., (N. D.) 200 N. W. 1016 ____________________________ 101
Campbell vs. Newton, 152 Pac. 841 (Okl.) ------------------------------------------------102
Alexander vs. U. S. 138 U. S. 353 ---------------------------------------------------------------_! 14
American Bar Journal (Op. 23, May 1930) ----------·······-·-----------------------------115
State vs. Erickson No. 10540 (Dist. Court Salt Lake County) ______________ 119
16 Corpus Juris, p. 319, pp. 568 (p. 320, pp. 569) ____________________________ 126-127
People vs. Cohen, 118 Cal. 74, 50 Pac. 20 --------------------------------------------------127
Farnham vs. Colman, 19 So. Dakota 342 --------------------------------------130-131-132
In Re Mason, (D. C.) 43 Fed. 510 --------------------------------------------------------------130
George N. Farnham, 8 Mich. 89 -------------------------------------------------------------------.132
Peter Kerrigan, 33 New Jersey Law 344 at 349 -----------------------------------·------133
In Re Whitcomb, 120 Mass. 118, 21 Am. Rep. 502 ----------------------------------133
Haugley vs. Ryan, (Mo.) 81 S. W. 435 ------------------------------------------------------133
82 L. R. A. 1127, 1128 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------.134
United States vs. Jackson, 20 D. C. 424 ------------------------------------------------------135
McClanahan vs. Conn, 11 Ky. App. 72 ------------------------------------------------------136
Nichols vs. State (Okl.), 129 Pac. 673 --------------------------------------------------------136
Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. vs. Workers, (208 Fed. 335 at 344 ________ 136
Mitchell vs. Supreme Court, 125 Pac. 1061 (Calif.) ----------------------------------136
Hutton vs. Supreme Court, 81 Pac. 409 (Calif.) ----------------------------------------137
Coulter vs. People, 123 Pac. 647 (Calif.) --------------------------------------------------137
Rapalje on Contempts, Sec. 94 ----------------------------------------------------------------------137
Young vs. Cannon, 2 Utah 560 at 594 ----------------------------------------------------------138
6 Ruling Case Law, 532 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------_! 39
Belangee vs. State, (Neb.) 149 N. W. 415 ------------------------------------------------140
Hurdman vs. State, 54 Neb. 626 --------------------------------------------------------------------140
Ex Parte Fullen, 128 Pac. 64 (N. M.) -------------------------------------------------------_! 40
State vs. Sweetland, 54 N. W. 415 (S. D.) ------------------------------------------------140
Early vs. People, 117 Ill. App. 608 ---------------------------------------------------------------_! 41
State vs. Gallup, 1 Kans. App. 618, 42 Pac. 406 --------------------------------------141
Russell vs. Mandell, 136 Mich. 624, 99 N. W. 864 ----------------------------------141
State vs. Newton, 16 No. Dak. 151 ---------------------------------------·----------------------141
14 Am. and Eng. Ann. Cases. 1035, 1042 (Note) _____________________________ _141-142
Ludden vs. State, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 61 ------------------------------------------------------142
St. Amant vs. Beixcodin, 5 N. Y. Super. 703 --------------------------------------------142
State vs. Newton, (N. D.) 112 N. W. 52 --------------------------------------------------142
State vs. Conn, (Oregon) 62 Pac. 289 --------------------------------------------------------143
Freedman vs. Huron, 66 N. W. 928 (So. Dak.) _______________________________________ _! 43
Ex Parte Landry, 147 S. W. (Texas) 962 --------------------------------------------------143
22 Ruling Case Law, 97 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------144
16 Corpus Juris, 432 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------144
Confiscation Cases, 19 U. S. (L. Ed.) 196 --------------------------------------------------144
State vs. Laughlin, 10 Mo. App. Joe. cit. 6 --------------------------------------------------146
Weeks on Attorneys at Law, Sec. 80, p. 140 --------------------------------------------146

In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE UTAH STATE
BAR,
Defendant.

No. 6101

REVIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE UTAH STATE BAR, IN RE
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, No. F. 19

PLAINTIFFS BRIEF
Charges set forth in the complaint, No. F. 19, Paragraph III, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (h), (i), (j), and
(k), were not sustained by either the Disciplinary Committee composed of LeRoy B. Young, Royal J. Douglas
and Stuart P. Dobbs, or the Board of Commissioners of
the Utah State Bar.
Charges set forth in Paragraph III, subdivision (g)
were not sustained by said Disciplinary Committee who
heard and received the evidence in the case but the Findings of this Committee were reversed by the said Board
of Commissioners without any additional evidence offered or received by them.
Charges set forth in Paragraph III, subdivision (d),
(e), (f), (l) and (m), were sustained in whole or in part
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by said Disciplinary Committee and said Board of Cornmissioners as the Findings of Fact of these respective
boards will show.
Plaintiff will treat the sustained charges under
three heads, namely : W underli (d), ~Woodland (e) and
York (f) as No. I; Sutfin (g) as No. II and Harry Erickson (1) and (rn) as No. III. The evidence submitted
for and against these charges is abstracted and reviewed
herein to assist your Honorable Court to cull out from
approximately 2000 pages of evidence requiring more
than 40 days to present before courts and other tribunals, material matters vital to the issues herein.
NO. I

(Subdivisions ( d)-Wunderli, (e)-Woodland, and
(f)-York.)
In these allegations, R. Verne McCullough is charged with soliciting employment through one Sid Spencer.
The factual testimony is as follows:
Subd. (d)FRITZ WUNDERLI, witness for the prosecution:
288
Direct Examination: I am one of the operators of the Beau Brummel Cafe. On the 11th of
January, 1934, my wife, Blanche vVunderli, and
I were riding in an automobile which collided with
a Union Pacific train drawn by a gasoline motor
car. I was not injured but my wife was and she
was taken to the Emergency Hospital. The next
morning, January 12, 1934, a person carne to my
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residence who said his name was Sid Spencer.
Q. Do you have any recollection of what he
looked like?
A. Oh, I only know he was taller than I, and
290
younger. That is all I can remember.
This person introduced himself and then gave
291
us a card similar to Exhibit "C."
Q. Now, after this card was handed to you,
Mr. vVunderli, what, if anything was said?
(Accused objects to conversation as incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and hearsay. Ob290-1 jection overruled on statement of counsel it would
be properly connected up.)
A. Yes, he said he was in with Mr. Verne McCullough, and asked me if I knew him, and I said;
''No,'' and he said he would like to take the case.
292
That is about the conversation we had together ...
Q. Did he have any documents there with him
that he presented to you for your signature, or
your wife's signature?
A. No.
Q. He did not 1
A. No.
Q. Did you see this man Spencer again?
A. No.
Q. Did you do any business with him there
that day?
292
A. No.
Cross Examination by Mr. McC~tllough: About
three or four months ago Mr. McCullough came to
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293

294

the Cafe and Mr. Glaus, my partner, brought him
out to the kitchen. I told Mr. McCullough at that
time that the person who came to my home about
our case was a neighbor in Highland Park and
that I did not remember his name.
Q. When I asked you about it, didn't you
state to me that the only thing you knew about
this person was that he was a neighbor, living at
Highland Park, and that you did not remember
his name 1
A. Well, at that time I guess I didn't remember it any more.
Q. Who put it in your head about this situation of getting a card with that name on it, "Sid
Spencer~''

A. That affidavitQ. When did you sign that affidavit~
A. At the time of the accident-! guess about
a month after. No, it didn't take that long. A
few weeks after the accident.
Q. And who prepared the affidavit~
A. Oh, some fellow from the Union Pacific
office.
Q. And he prepared the affidavit and had you
sign iU
A. Yes.
Q. And m the affidavit he stated that Sid
Spencer had come to your home 1
A. Yes.
Q. And when I talked to you about it you had
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forgotten about the statement m the affidavit,
hadn't you?
A. No, not in the affidavit. I knew about it.
Q. You had forgotten the name?
A. Yes.
Q. You could not give me a description of
him the day I was in the cafe, could you?

295

A. No. I can't now.
Q. Was he light or dark complexioned?
A. I would not know.
Q. You would not know?
A. No.
Q. That is the only incident, or the only thing
that was done at that particular time-he just
came in and said that he was in with Mr. McCullough, and he would like to take the case?

296

A. Yes sir.
Q. And then he never came back again?
A. I never seen him.
Q. He did not offer you any contract to sign?
A. No, not that morning, no.
Q. If you never saw him after that, he could
not have offered it to you after that, could he? He
never offered you any contract any other time?
A. No; I haven't seen him.
I was very much surprised to learn the identity of Verne McCullough. I thought he was a
much larger and older man. I never talked with
Mr. McCullough or had any personal dealings
with him. The name on the card that I received

6

from this person who said he was Mr. Spencer
was "United Claims Adjustment Bureau." I gave
the card to Mr. Goodnow, the Union Pacific Claim
298 Agent, when I signed the affidavit on January 23,
1934. I have never seen the man since who came
299
to my place and said he was Sid Spencer. This
man did not ask me to sign any contract or anything of that kind.
The accused moved to strike all the witness'
testimony as incompetent, irrelevant and imma301
terial. Motion denied.
Subd. (d)BLANCHE WUNDERLI, a witness for the prosecution:
Direct Examination: I am the wife of Fritz
Wunderli. On January 11, 1934, I was injured
in an accident in a collision between a Union Pacific car and the automobile in which I was riding.
I live at 1482 Stratford Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
302
The next day a man came to my house who
said he was Sid Spencer. He handed us a card
similar to Exhibit "C."
303
I had the following eonversation with this
man who gave his name as Sid Spencer:
(Same objection as interposed to Fritz \Vunderli's testimony. Overruled 303).
A. He asked us all about the accident, and
just about what extent that the injuries came to,
and he said something like this : ''Why not let us
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304

305

308

handle this case for you~" And he says, "You
know you might just as well make some money out
of this, because there may be injuries that you
have now that won't show up until later on. You
might just as well get some money out of it." I
think that is about the main things he said.
When this man introduced himself he handed
us the card and said he was with McCullough. He
did not tell me McCullough was a lawyer. The
next afternoon he called me on the telephone and
said:
A. He asked how I was, and I told him I was
all right, there was no injuries that I knew anything about. And he said, "Well," he said, "have
you decided what to do about-about letting us
handle your case 1'' I said, ''No. My husband is
in town, and we have not decided yet.''
Q. Anything else said at that time?
A. No, I don't-! could not remember anything else.
I did not ask him nor did he tell me how he
learned of our accident. He was rather tall, medium complexioned, clear skinned, peppy in his
nature and gracious in his manners.
Cross Examinat,ion: I have never talked to
Mr. McCullough at any time about my case against
the railroad. The claim agent for the railroad who
presented the affidavit paid us $115 as the adjustment of our claim. The following statement
is in the affidavit I signed:
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''That the said Sid Spencer did not ask her
to sign a contract, or say how much money he
could recover for her, but if she did decide to give
309 him the case, to come to his office or call him.''
I did not mention anything in the affidavit
about injuries which might appear hereafter. I
just thought of that now. Mr. Thomas suggested
310 I refresh my memory since I was subpoenaed. Mr.
Thomas brought me the affidavit from the rail312
road company to refresh my memory.
Defendant's affidavit marked Exhibit 11 received in evidence as part of the cross examina312
tion of witness.
Subd. (d)-

788

R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, witness for the
defense.
Direct Examination: I did not authorize, empower or talk to Mr. Sid Spencer about soliciting
the case of Mr. Fritz VVunderli and Blanche Wunderli, his wife, relative to their accident which occurred January 11, 1934. I knew nothing about
the incident until it was called to my attention in
the latter part of the year 1937 when the preliminary charges were submitted to me by Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Tingey. I then called
on Mr. Glaus of the Beau Brummel Cafe who was
a partner of Mr. Wunderli. Mr. Wunderli was
working in the kitchen. Mr. Wunderli did not
know who I was and stated that he had never
talked with me about this accident at any time.
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That I had never been in his home and that he
had never been in my office. He was very surprised to learn that I was Verne McCullough as
he thought McCullough was a much larger fellow
and a big shot around town. I asked him why he
had signed an affidavit to the effect that I had
solicited his business. He stated a neighbor in
Highland Park had recommended that Verne McCullough handle his case. He said he did not remember the neighbor's name; that he lived in
Highland Park was all the information he could
give me. He could not describe the person who
made the recommendation that he get Verne McCullough to handle his case. I never knew Mr.
Spencer had any connection with this case whatsoever. He was never authorized to solicit the
case for me at any time.

Subd. (e)W. T.
187

188

~WOODLAND,

a witness for the prose-

cution.
Direct Examination: My address is 210 North
State Street. I had an automobile accident on October 23, 1933. At that time I resided at 252 Almond Street. After the accident I was first taken
to the Emergency Hospital for about one and onehalf hours and then the police took me home. The
next afternoon I was taken to the L.D.S. Hospital.
I was in the hospital between three and four weeks.
The morning after the accident a person called at
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our home and said his name was Spencer. I do not
remember his first name.
189

Q.

~What,

if anything, did you say to him~
(The accused objects-immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant. Same ruling heretofore made
in \Vunderli case.)
A. That there conversation now is a pretty
hard thing for me to say exactly what it was.

Q. Tell us about it to the best of your memory.

190

A. Well, he-first-when he first came in-I
can't remember exactly-but he was there in the
interest of my accident, and what I understood he
was there to take the case. I know that I asked
him the question if he was a lawyer, and finally
he says, ''No.'' And, in the first place, I thought
he was the man-the way I had it in my head, he
was the man that was representing the insurance
company. That is the way I got it in my head to
start with. And then he finally told me, and what
I understand, he told me he was there in the interest of other lawyers or of the lawyer.
Q. And did he mention who that lawyer

was~

A. As far as I remember he mentioned McCullough, and I remember that name more than
I do the other name, if he mentioned it.
Q. Do you remember that he mentioned the
name of McCullough~
A. Yes, he mentioned the name of McCullough, as I remember.

11
Q. And did he mention the name of any other

190

lawyed
A. vV ell now, I wouldn't swear to that, whether he did or did not.
Q. I see.
A. I wouldn't swear to it.
Q. What did he say about Mr. McCullough~
MR. DOBBS: You say he mentioned Mr. McCullough's name more than that of any other lawyer. Had you some other lawyer's name in your
mind when you made the answed
A. Well, I have heard this other man's name
-Spence, as near as I Q. Spencer~
A. I have heard his name, and it might be
that I heard that there.
MR. HANSEN : Spence or Spencer~
A. Well, I get that mixed up.
MR. HANSEN: Was the other lawyer's name
Spence~

A. Spence was his name. As far as I am concerned on this thing I might be mixed up on it
some because my doctor told me I had lost enough
blood when I was in the Emergency Hospital to
kill most any man, and when I was there-I can
remember lots more about the accident than I can
when I was in bed.
Q. Now, what did he say with respect to Mr.
McCullough~

A. I can't remember what he said about Mr.
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191
193

McCullough or the other lawyers. I could not do
that and be truthful about it.
I never saw Mr. Spencer after that morning.
I remember that I signed a paper.
Q. Now, Mr. Woodland, what was that paper,
if you know~
A. Well, I will tell you-I can't tell you a
thing that was in it. That is one thing I cannot
do. I cannot remember a word that is in it. He
read it to me, but still I cannot remember it.
Q. Did Mr. Spencer say anything to you about
what the paper was~

A. I know he read it over to me, and I signed
it.

193

194

194

Q. You don't recall what was in iU
A. I can't remember-I can't recall a thing
that was in this paper." ....

MR. YOUNG: Did he tell you what the purpose of the paper was?
A. Well, the purpose of the paper was-what
I understood-was to enter suit against the company for this accident, in the first place ...
Q. Did Mr. Spencer say to you who was to
enter the suiU
A. No, I can't say that he did. It seems to me
like I remember that he said this was a preliminary, or something like that. He came back afterwards and seen my wife afterwards about the
thing.
On October 26, 1933, I gave a statement to the
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194

195

199

200

200

agent of an insurance company concerning this
incident. (Over the objection of the accused the
witness was shown statement he signed for the
insurance agent and read the same to refresh his
memory. The witness then testified to a long ambiguous and unintelligible conversation, contained
on pages 197-8 in which he said Mr. Spencer told
him he was not a lawyer but mentioned two lawyers named McCullough and Spence.)
I never saw Mr. McCullough at any time until
yesterday (Tuesday, July 12, 1938).
In answer to the question as to whether he
knew Benjamin Spence, the lawyer, the witness
said:
A. No, I don't. I will tell you this whole thing
was kind of blurred to me at that time, and as far
as I am concerned in this thing there might be a
lot of things that I may say now that might not
be exactly right because I can't remember exactly.
I got a faint idea and that has kind of left me.
MR. DOBBS: You were not in condition to
have a very good recollection left in your memory~

I did not have any law suit. I settled with the
insurance company myself. Speaking of the statement in the affidavit he gave to the insurance
agent, the witness testified:
A. Yes. One thing I would like to say: When
this document was made up, this here man (insurance adjuster) said, "This is for nothing at all, but
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202
202

203

203

204

just to relieve us of any suit, or anything that
might come up afterwards, and this paper will
never be shown.'' And I have often wondered how
you fellows got hold of this-because he told me
absolutely-I told him I didn't want anything like
this to come up, and I didn't know it was going
to come up, but he said, "It will never be used
for anything else." That is what he told me.
MR. YOUNG: Are you put out about it1
A. Why, yes, I was kind of put out about it.
I felt kind of bad about it, because I might have
done it in a different way. I might have had the
thing weighed heavier-maybe not on this particular accident, and I might have considered the
thing more if I had thought it was coming up for
this purpose.
(Judge Hansen moved to strike the entire
testimony of the witness.)
MR. YOUNG: Unless there is some further
connection, I am inclined to think probably the
committee would agree with you, but if there is
another witness, I think probably we should reserve it until we hear her testimony.
MR. DOUGLAS: Perhaps it will be well to
reserve your right, and we will skip along and we
won't have to bother unless it is connected.
C'ross Examination: I have a son by the name
of Phillip who told me that he knew Mr. Spencer.
I have never seen Mr. McCullough in my life until
yesterday (July 12, 1938). I have never talked

15
with Mr. McCullough about my accident. I have
never been in his office and he has had nothing
to do with my case whatsoever. The statement I
signed about the Spencer incident for the insurance company was in the handwriting of the in204
surance adjuster. I am positive that Mr. Spencer
said he was not a lawyer, notwithstanding my affidavit states that Mr. Spencer said that he was
an attorney. Mr. Spencer never told me anything
205
like that. At the time I settled with the insurance
adjuster, Mr. Abbott, he told me he wanted a
statement that would protect them by settling with
me personally without bringing Mr. Spencer into
the case. The insurance adjuster did not give me
205
or my wife a copy of the statement. Mr. Spencer
never came back to see me. I do not know Mr.
Callister. I have never seen him in my life. I have
never had any connection with the law firm of Mc206-7 Cullough & Callister. Mr. Spenc.er was a tall man
207
and dark complexioned. The only thing I can remember about him was that he was tall and dark
207
complexioned and about thirty years old.
Subd. (e)MRS. LYDIA WOODLAND, a witness for
209
the prosecution.
Direct Examination: I am the wife of W. T.
Woodland, who was injured in an accident on the
23rd of October, 1933. The next morning after the
accident a man came to my door and asked if this
was where Mr. W ooland lived and if he could see
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211

212
213

him. I took this man into the bedroom. He was
fair faced, light complexioned and about as tall as
Mr. Thomas. He had a conversation with my husband in the bedroom. I cannot tell you exactly
what the conversation was as I was busy running
between the bedroom door and the bathroom door
to get the wash basin to clean my husband up.
This man had a paper and on the bottom of the
paper was the name "S" "Spencer." I do not
recall what the middle initial was. It was beautifully written.
There was something on this paper saying
something about a suit, or "You might have half,
or nothing; if you have nothing you don't have to
pay anything,'' and that is as much as I recall,
and I don't just recall what else was in the paper.
(The accused objected to witness' conversation as hearsay. Overruled.)
Whether the names of McCullough and Callister were mentioned there or not, I don't know.
After being instructed by Mr. Dobbs and Mr.
Young as to whether she had any recollection as
to any names being there at all, the witness answered:
A. I am sure the man came in, and I am sure
he was standing over the bed in this fashion, with
a paper in his hand, and I am sure I saw this name,
written at the bottom, as I said, and I am sure my
husband said, "Well, what do you think?" and
I says-I don't remember whether I says: "I don't
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213

214

215

216

know,'' or not. I don't recall what I answered.
This man came to my house the next day.
Q. And do you recall what he said to you at
that timef
A. He came to the door, and I just don't recollect whether he gave his name or not, but I remember he came inside. I must have invited him
in, and then inside he had a paper in his hand,
and he said, "I came about this suit," but I didn't
see a thing that was on the paper at that time. He
was nervous. As I remember, he trembled, sort
of, and I said, "Well, there isn't any suit." He
said, "But you have started suit." I says, "No,
we haven't. How can you go on with a suit if we
don't want any suitf" That is all that was done.
He went.
Q. Now, he didn't come back any more, and
you didn't see anything more of him f
Q. Mrs. Woodland, did you see Mr. McCullough at that timef
A. No.
The first time I saw Mr. McCullough was
about a week ago. It was after I got my subpoena.
Or ass Examination: After I got my subpoena
I requested friends of mine, Mr. and Mrs. Clayton,
to have Mr. McCullough come and see me. I told
Mr. McCullough that after this man came to see
my husband the day after the accident that about
an hour after he had gone, an attorney had come
and left his card. I do not recall his name. This
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attorney was officing in the Kearns Building. I
216 have not been able to find the card. The contract
or the paper I saw this man reading to my husband the morning after the accident contained on217
ly the name of Spencer. I cannot recall the name
of McCullough and Callister or McCullough being
on the paper at all. This man never left any card
217
but the attorney who came about an hour after
he had gone, left me a card and the card showed
he was officing in the Kearns Building. The person's name on the card was not McCullough and
was not Callister. I told Mr. Thomas about that
218
person and tried to find the card but I had mislaid it.
(At this time accused renewed the motion to
strike the entire testimony of Mr. W. T. \Voodland on the ground it was immaterial and irrelevant and that the testimony of Mrs. vV. T. Woodland had in nowise connected up the testimony of
her husband in any way with Mr. R. Verne McCullough. Mr. Young indicated that the motion
203
should be granted unless Mrs. Woodland's testimony was sufficient to connect Mr. McCullough
with the incident. The motions taken under ad220
visement.)
Subd. (e)R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for the
defense.
Direct Examination: I do not know anything
about Mr. Sid Spencer interviewing Mr. and Mrs.
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W. T. Woodland about an automobile accident
which occurred October 23, 1933. This matter was
790
called to my attention for the first time by the
special committee in the latter part of the year
1937. I never met Mr. Woodland in my life until
I saw him up here at the hearing. I met Mrs.
Woodland about two weeks before the hearing at
her home when she requested a mutual friend,
Mrs. Alma Clayton, to have me call and see her. I
never saw any instrument or document signed by
Mr. Woodland in connection with the matter. When
I called on Mrs. -woodland she told me that the
only name that was signed on the statement besides that of her husband was "Spencer." She
said she did not remember the name of McCullough or Callister ever appearing on the paper.
She told me there was a lawyer in the Kearns
building who came to see her about an hour after
Mr. Spencer had been there and gave her his card,
but she had misplaced the card. She said this law792
yer was not Mr. McCullough nor Mr. Callister.
I did not employ Mr. Spencer to solicit that case
and knew nothing about the matter until it was
called to my attention over four years after it
happened by the special committee. I never authorized Mr. Spencer to represent me and I doubt
very much if he did.
Subd. (f)CLARENCE YORK, a witness for the prosecution.
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Dir.ect Examination: I reside at Orem, Utah.
164 I was in a railroad crossing accident at Midvale,
Utah, in October of 1931. Shirley Erickson, Oren
Swenson, Naomi Gooen and Louise Christensen
were also in the accident. Sid Spencer came down
165
to Orem to see me four or five days after the accident. He said he was out in behalf of the law
firm of McCullough and Callister of Salt Lake
City; that he had been out and taken pictures and
measurements of the accident and that he wanted
us to turn our case over to the law firm. I signed
166
a contract at that time. I did not keep a copy of
it. The contract gave the law firm the right to
proceed with our case. I do not ren1;ember the
167-8 name of McCullough and Callister in the. contract.
Shirley Erickson, Oren Swenson and myself met
at the Erickson house. We all signed the same contract on the same piece of paper. About a month
after the accident Mr. Spencer took the three of
us up to McCullough's office. Mr. Spencer introduced us to Mr. McCullough. The witness then
testified as follows:
A. He introduced us and we talked about the
accident, just how it happened, and all.
Q. Whom did you talk to about it?
A. With Mr. McCullough.
Q. How long were you in Mr. McCullough's
169
office~

A. Oh, I don't remember exactly-half or
three quarters of an hour.

1..'
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Q. Was there any dism~ssion had at that time
with respect to the contract you had signed?
A. No sir.
Q. What was the discussion at that time, do
you recall~
A. The discussion at that time was how it
happened, and so forth.
Q. Was there any discussion at all with respect to Mr. McCullough handling the case~
A. Well, we naturally assumed he was.
Q. I know --- but was there any discussion
about it~
A. Well, he was asking about how it happened, and all, yes.
Q. Did he ask you anything about your paying him for it, or anything of that sort?
A. No.
Q. Who was present at that time, Mr. York~
A. Shirley Ericksen and Oren Swenson and
myself, and Sid Spencer.
Q. And Mr. McCullough was there, wasn't he~
A. Yes, Mr. McCullough.
Q. Now, did you ever go to court on your
case?
A. No sir.
Q. Did you ever get any money out of your
case~

170

A. Yes sir, one hundred dollars.
Cross Examination: When we went to M cCullough's office we did not sign anything at all.
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Q. Did you ever sign a statement at any time,
about how this accident occurred?
A. Yes-with McKinney from the Railroad
Company.
Q. Anyone else besides McKinney~
A. No sir....
Q. Never signed one for McCullough and Callister-is that right~ ...
A. There was the one with the railroad, and
the one that Sid Spencer brought down to Orem.
Q. And those were the only ones you ever
signed 1
A. Yes sir.
Q. You are certain about thaH
A. Yes sir.
The matter of an employment contract was
not suggested or discussed at all with McCullough
in his office.
I was not consulted about the settlement at
all. They settled without my consent. The settlement was not satisfactory to me. We agreed to
pay one-third. The settlement check was $150.
I endorsed it and accepted a $100 check. I am a
barber by trade. I never told Mr. McCullough that

I was not satisfied with the settlement. I never
discussed the terms of the contract with Mr. McCullough in his office. The chief purpose we had
in going to his office was just to relate how the
accident happened. Louise Christensen signed the
same contract that we (York, Swenson and Erick-
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son) signed at Erickson's home at Orem. I remember Elmo Christensen came down with Mr.
Spencer at that time. I had forgotten about him.
They, Elmo Christensen and Spencer, told me that
Mr. McCullough was repres.enting Louise Chris181
tensen. At that time I did not sign a statement of
182
how the accident occurred.
(Statement marked "Defendant's Exhibit 4"
shown to witness York.)
182
The witness said, "That is my signature."
(The witness reads statement.) That statement
183
is a true account of how the accident occurred. I
do not recall where I signed it.
(Defendant's Exhibit '' 5,'' check issued to
186 York, received in evidence.)
Subd. (f)SOREN C. CHRISTENSEN, a witness on
behalf of defendant.
222
Direct Examination: I reside at Moroni, Utah.
I have a daughter by the name of Louise Christensen Erickson who is now married to Shirley Erickson. My daughter was injured in a railroad accident on Sunday evening, October 11, 1931. Clarence York was driving the automobile which collided with the D. & R. G. train at Midvale, Utah.
The next day Mr. Kinney, the adjuster for the
railroad company came to the home where I was
224
staying and offered me $250 to settle the case. In
the afternoon of that day I went to the office of
R. Verne McCullough. Mr. McCullough was re-
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commended to me by Mrs. Michaels, my daughter's landlady, a Mr. Draper, who formerly lived
in Moroni and was then living in Salt Lake City,
224-5 and a Mrs. Calder. On Tuesday, October 13, 1931,
my daughter and I signed the contract with Mr.
McCullough. We were the only persons who signed this contract. Three boys were riding in the
car at the time of the accident. Clarence York
was the driver and Shirley :BJrickson and Oren
Swenson were passengers in the car. On W ednesday, the 14th day of October, 1931, these three boys
came to a place where I was staying in Salt Lake
City and I told them that I had decided to engag:e
Mr. McCullough as our attorney to take care of
my daughter's case and the boys told me they intended to support the girl by all means and in as
much as we had engaged Mr. McCullough they felt
like they would engage him for their part of the
226
affair too. Clarence Y ark said at that time that inasmuch as we had engaged McC1J,llough as our attorney that he felt like it was better that the rest
o,f them engage McCullough to handle the case al228
together. I had not seen or talked with Sid Spencer up to this time. Thursday, the 14th of October,
1931, I went up the second time to McCullough's
office with my son. Mr. McCullough sent Mr.
226
Spencer with my son to investigate the facts in
the case. I have been the Justice of the Peace at
228
Moroni, Utah.

Cross Examination: I went to Mr. McCul-
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lough's office after I talked with Mrs. Michaels
and Mr. Draper. It was on the 7th floor of the
Judge Building. The name on the door was McCullough and Callister. I do not recall Sid Spencer's name being on the door. I think I signed the
written contract on my second visit to McCullough's office when my son was with me. I met
Mr. Spencer at the General Hospital after I had
been to Mr. McCullough's office the first time.
My understanding was that Mr. Spencer was engaged by Mr. McCullough to investigate and get the
evidence in the case. Mr. Spencer introduced himself and said he was working with Mr. McCullough
on the case, but he did not ask me anything about
it at that time. Mr. Spencer did not say anything
about Mr. McCullough's ability as a lawyer. Mr.
Spencer did not say that Mr. McCullough was particularly resourceful in that kind of a law suit.
That is what Mrs. Calder said. Mr. Spencer did
not show me any card similar to Exhibit ''C.''
Q. Now, you told us about this conversation
down here where those three boys were present.
Do you recaii positively that Mr. York stated that
he was going to engage Mr. McCullough 1
A. They, all three boysQ. I didn't ask about the three-I asked you
about Mr. York.
A. Well, Mr. Y ark said, like the rest of them,
inasmuch as he made this remark first, that he
was the driver of the car, and they were anxious
to see my daughter get justice-and he says, "Inr
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asmuch as you are engaging Mr. McCullough--he
felt like they would all engage Mr. McCullough."

Mr. McCullough at no time made a statement
to me that he would like to get the rest of the
cases. Mr. Spencer is quite tall, a well built man
and has fair complexion. He has a rather light
skin. He had a pleasant demeanor and was very
much a gentleman. He looked like he had been
237-8 an athlete.
Upon examination by Mr. Young the witness
testified as follows :
Q. Mr. Christensen, how did you come to meet
Mr. Spencer at the hospital?

A. I could not say-only I think he was going with Mr. Kinney, the railroad adjuster, when
I met him. What his business was there, I could
not239

Q. What did he say to you when he met you
there at the hospital, do you recall~

A. No.
Q. Did he tell you his name?
A. He introduced himself.
Q. Did he tell you whether someone had sent
him there to see you?
A. No sir. He just told me that he had-that
he was engaged with Mr. McCullough in collecting evidence in cases of that nature, and I think
he stated that he had come to see about the girlher condition-in tbe hospital.
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Q. When was that with respect to the time
you spoke to Mr. McCullough first1

A. The time that I met Mr. Spencer was about
a day after I had been to Mr. McCullough's office.
Q. About a day afted

240

242

A. Yes.
Examination by Mr. Douglas:
The first time I talked with Mr. Spencer at
the hospital I did not discuss the facts surrounding my daughter's accident. I signed the contract
in Mr. McCullough's office in the presence of my
son. My daughter signed the contract at the hospital.

Redirect Examination:
243

My daughter got a copy of the contract.
At the time I first talked with Mr. McCullough, and before the formal contract was signed,
I understood that he was to proceed with the case.
The witness testified as follows:
Q. Was there anything said at that particular
time, or do you recall anything said about the investigation~

A. No sir; nothing any more than-there was
nothing said about the investigation, only I gave
you the idea that we would very likely engage you
to handle the case, and, of course, my understanding was that you would proceed from that on until
at least-calculate that you were getting the case.
Q. In other words, you gave me the impres-
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sion, in that conversation, that I was to go ahead
with the case~
A. Yes sir.
Q. There isn't any question about that, Is
there~

A. No sir.
MR. DOUGLAS: That was decided.
244
A. Yes.
I think it was Friday the 16th of October, 1931
or probably Saturday the 17th, that my son went
out with Mr. Spencer to, Orem to interview these
witnesses, Clarence York, Shirley Erickson and
245
Oren Swenson.
The County physicians were handling my
daughter's case. I was dissatisfied with their
treatment and Mr. McCullough recommended Dr.
A. Cyril Callister, an abdominal surgeon to take
care of my daughter as she had four fractures of
248-9 the pelvis. The understanding was that if Mr. McCullough collected from the railroad company my
daughter would pay Dr. Callister, and if she did
250
not, she had nothing to pay with and could not pay.
Subd. (f)LOUISE ERICKSON, a witness for the defense.
Direct Examination: I am the wife of Shirley
Erickson. My maiden name was Louise Christensen. I was in the crossing accident at Midvale,
Utah, when the car in which I was riding collided
with the Denver and Rio Grande railroad train on
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October 11, 1931. Mr. York was driving the automobile. After the accident I was taken to the Salt
Lake County General Hospital. I stayed there until the following Saturday, when I was taken to
the home of Katherine Michael, 475 Second East.
I had pelvis fractures, a fractured hip and internal
injuries and bruises.
I never had any conversation with Mr. Sid
Spencer at the General Hospital. I talked with
him the first time down at Mrs. Michael's home.
On Tuesday, following· the accident my father talked with me about employing Mr. McCullough and
I told him to do as he saw best. I signed an agreement at the hospital for Mr. McCullorugh to handle
my case. Mr. Spencer was not there at that time.
A copy of the contract was given to me and I have
it at my home. I filed suit in my case and it was
settled by Mr. McCullough for approximately
$4500. I did not see Mr. Spencer until a week
after the accident. He took a statement of my version of the accident three or four days after I got
back to Mrs. Michael's.
Q. Did he (Mr. Spencer) attempt, at any
time, to get you to say anything that was not absolutely accurate, about this case 1
A. No sir.
Q. Did Mr. Spencer at any time in your entir,e
experience in this particular case, ever ask you, or
talk to you about employing me?
A. No.
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Q. Did he make any mention about employment, as far as I was concerned?
280
A. No, he did no,t; he never mentioned that.
Cross Examination: Mr. McCullough did not
tell me that Mr. York intended to sue me for $500.
He never made such a statement. Mr. McCullough
at no time told me that Mr. York was going to
bring a suit against me to recover part of the
281 money that I received from the railroad. The first
time I saw Mr. Spencer was down at Mrs. Michael's home. I signed a typewritten statement of
the facts regarding the accident for Mr. Spencer
at Mrs. Michael's home about two weeks after the
282-3 accident. Mr. Spencer had statements of the other
people who were in the automobile, giving their
version of how the accident occurred. My father
283
came to the hospital with a contract to emplo,y Mr.
284 McCullough and I signed it at the hospital. I do
not remember the date. I do not remember seeing
Mr. Kinney, the railroad claim adjuster at the
hospital. I have never met Mr. Kinney . .I paid
Dr. Callister at the time I received my settlement
from the railroad. The check was made out to me
285
and Dr. Callister for $110 and I endorsed the
check. The settlement with the railroad company
286 was consummated in Mr. McCullough's office. My
287 father made the arrangements to employ Dr. Callister.
288
(Defendant's Exhibit No. "10," check given
to Dr. Callister.)
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Subd. (f)SHIRLEY ERICKSON, a witness for the defense.

Direct Examination: I live at Guadalupe, California. October 1931 I lived at Orem, Utah. My
wife's name is Louise Christensen Erickson. I
was in the crossing accident on October 11, 1931,
at Midvale, Utah, with my wife Louise, Clarence
York, Oren Swenson and a young lady by the
252
name of Gooen. The first time I discussed with
the occupants of the car about the employment of
a lawyer was up at Mrs. Michael's place when we
talked to Mr. Boren C. Christensen and Mr. Christensen told us that he had employed Mr. M cCullough and we all decided we would stick together
253-4 and have the same lawyer. I had not seen Mr.
Spencer up to this time. A few days after that
conversation Mr. Spencer came down to my home
at Orem with Elmo Christensen, the son of Soren
C. Christensen, and talked with Clarence York,
Oren Swenson and myself.
Q. Who was present in your home at the time
he came down~

A. Why, I think all of us fellows met over
to my place.
Q. Who were the fellows that

met~

A. Clarence Y o,rk and Oren Swenson and my-

self.
Q. What did Mr. Spencer do at that

time~
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A. Well, he just took the notes of the accident
as we told him.
Q. How did he take those notes, if you recallf
A. Well, he just wrote it down on a piece of
paper.
Q. Did he use a typewriter, or longhand, or
whaU
A. He just used longhand.
Q. After he got this-did he interview you, or
anybody separately?
A. No; altogether.
Q. Did you all give a separate version of the
case?
A. Yes sir.
Q. After he wrote the notes down did you sign
the notes that he had 7
A. Yes, I think we signed the notes ....
Q. Did Mr. Spencer, at amy time during that
conversation ever ask you, or anybody, any of the
o,thers to sign a contract to employ me?
A. No sir.
Q. Did you sign a contract at that time, that
Mr. Spencer handed you, to employ me?
A. No sir.
Q. Did you see any of the others szgn any
contract?
A. I did not.
Q. Did Mr. Spencer, in your presence, and in
the presence of those people, while you wer.e there,
mention anything about a contract to employ me?
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A. No sir.
Q. I will ask you, Mr. Erickson, if Mr. Spencer at any time, ever asked you, or made any intimation whatsoever about your coming to me, and
employing me as your attorney?
A. No sir.
Q. Let me call your attention agatn to the
time that the two other boys and yourself were
down at your house, two or three days after the
accident. I think you said somewhere around the
latter part of the week of the 11th, did you see any
co,ntracts exhibited to any of those boys, or did
260
you see them sign a contract at that time?
A. No. There was none signed.
Q. Was ther,e anything signed except the longhand notes which Mr. Spencer took from you
there?
261
A. That was all.
About Christmas time Mr. York, Mr. Swenson and myself went to Mr. McCullough's office
255-6 to see what Mr. McCullough could do for us. We
signed some typewritten copies of the longhand
notes that we gave to Mr. Spencer. Exhibit "7",
containing my signature and that of M. 0. Swen256
son is that which we signed. That statement contains the correct version of the accident. At that
time we told Mr. McCullough to go, ahead and do
257
what he could for us as we all wanted to stick with
Louise. Mr. McCullough said he would take our
cases on the same basis that he had taken Louise's.
255

34
258

There was no written contract drawn up at that
time and I did not sign any contract with Mr. M cCullough. Later, after Christmas, Mr. McCullough
called us in and Mr. York, Mr. Swenson and myself went up to Mr. McCullough's office about an
offer of settlement. I got $100 out of the settle260
ment. Exhibit "8" is the check I received. The
settlement for all three of us was consummated at
260
Mr. McCullough's office one or two days after
Christmas.
Cross Examination: I think Mr. York as
driver of the car signed a separate statement than
the one Mr. Swenson and myself signed. The first
time I saw Sid Sp.encer was when he came down
to my mother's place at Orem with my brother-in..law, Elmo Christensen, and took the notes of our
269
version of the accident, which we signed. He said
he was working with Mr. McCullough and wanted
whatever information we could giv.e him on the
accident. That is all he said about Mr. M cCul270-1 laugh. I do not recall seeing the name of Sid
Spencer on the door of Mr. McCullough's office.
I signed the release to the railroad company at
Mr. McCullough's office. Later Mr. Spencer came
274
down to Orem and delivered us our checks.
Subd. (f)R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for
the defense.
Direct Examination: I saw Clarence York the
first time in my office in the fall of 1931. I was
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preparing the Louise Erickson case for trial when
he came up there with other witnesses. I went
over his testimony as to what he would testify to
and called his attention to the statement (Exhibit
4) which he had heretofore given Mr. Spencer.
The next time I saw Mr. York was in my office
after Christmas of 1931. Prior to this I had talked to the claim agent of the Denver & Rio Grande
Railroad and in the course of negotiations for
settlement of the Louise Erickson case, something
was said with reference to the other passengers in
the car and the claim agent stated he would prefer
to get the entire matter settled with everybody if
it could be settled. I discussed with Mr. York and
the other passengers of the automobile the question of getting a settlement and they told me their
primary interest was in Miss Christensen's case.
They further told me that I had better take care
of all their cases. I told them I would represent
them on the same basis as I was representing Miss
Christensen. Their 'injuries were trivial and I did
not take a written contract from Mr. York. Mr.
York's doctor submitted a bill of $2. Mr. York
did not tell me about any injury to his shoulder
and that he was laid up for about three weeks. I
told these passengers, including Mr. York, that I
could get them $150 plus the cost of the damage
to the automobile. Mr. York got $100 out of the
settlement. His case was never filed in court and
I never contemplated filing it in court. This ac-
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cident occurred on Sunday night, the 11th day of
October, 1931. Mr. Soren C. Christensen came
into my office on Tuesday afternoon following the
accident. He stated that I had been recommended
to him to handle the case for his daughter who was
injured in the railroad accident and that she was
in the hospital. We went over the rna tter as far
as he knew it. He told me she had four fractures
of the pelvis bone and told me to go ahead and
proceed with the investigation. I told him I would
go ahead with the investigation and said we would
come to an understanding later on the contract.
I told him my usual contract was 33>1 per cent
if the matter was settled out of court and 50 per
cent of whatever was recovered after suit was
started and the complaint filed. He said that contract was satisfactory and to go ahead with the
case. One or two days later Mr. Christensen came
back with his son, Elmo Christensen, to my office.
I introduced them at that time to Mr. Sid Spencer,
who I employed to investigate the facts in this
case. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Christensen's son,
went to the different parties in the automobile for
the purpose of getting their statements. I have
some of these statements in longhand signed by
them and the statements transcribed into typewriting signed by them. I went over the typewritten statement with Mr. York which he had
signed. He offered no objections to the statement.
Mr. York was very happy about the entire situa-
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tion until he found out that Louise Christensen
was not going to give him a cut out of her $4500
which she got. He said he had been offered $500
by Mr. Kinney, the railroad claim agent for his
case but Mr. Kinney denied it. There was no
written contract for employment in this case ex797
cept the one signed by Boren C. Christensen and
his daughter, Louise Christensen. I did not direct
Sid Spencer to solicit any of these cases, including
that of Mr. York, Mr. Shirley Erickson, Mr. Oren
Swenson or anyone else. These other passengers
each received $100 from the railroad company and
799
I received $50 for each case.
Subd. (f)OREN M. SWENSON, a witness on behalf of
the prosecution.
(Defense objected to re-opening the York case
after prosecution had rested to put on the testimony of Oren Swenson for the reason that two of
the defense witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Shirley Erickson had gone back to California and another had
gone home to Moroni; that the testimony of these
witnesses had been taken and they were excused
667
when the prosecution stated they had no more
820-21 testimony to put on in the York case. The objection was taken under advisement and the testimony received.)
Direct Examination: I reside at Orem, Utah.
I was in a railroad crossing accident on October
11, 1931. It was my automobile driven by Mr.
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Clarence York which struck a Denver and Rio
Grande train at Midvale, Utah. The occupants of
the car were Clarence York, Louise Christensen,
Shirley Erickson, Naomi Gooen and myself. Shortly after the accident Mr. Sid Spencer interviewed
us at Orem, Utah.
A. He came down there and said he had been
thoroughly investigating the case, that we had a
good case, and he took some pictures, and wanted
us to sign a contract to let Mr. McCullough handle
the case. Miss Christensen had to be removed to
the County Hospital. We couldn't afford to do it.
He said they would take care of her. We all agreed
to let them have the case.
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to it as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial; nothing to
do with the issues involved here.
MR. YOUNG: The motion is denied.
Q. Now, Mr. Swenson, do you know-

MR. DOUGLAS: You say "we", who do you
refer to~
823

A. Mr. York, Mr. Erickson, and Louise's
brother was there, Elmo Christensen. . . .

Q. (By Mr. Thomas) \Vas anything said about
824

his (Spencer's) connection with Verne McCullough~

A. No sir; he just told us he had been out
and investigated the case and took some pictures,
and thought we had a good case ....
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Q. Now, I will ask you whether or not you
signed a paper for Mr. Spenced
825

A. I signed a contract, and Mr. Erickson, to
let Mr. Verne McCullough handle the case.
MR. YOUNG: Do you know what the paper
said 1
A. Well, I don't hardly remember the words.
I know that the contract said I had to get my
father to sign it with me.

826

MR. YOUNG: Do you recall his (McCullough's) name being in the contract 1
MR. McCULLOUGH: That is certainly leading and suggestive, your Honor.
MR. DOUGLAS: He has a right to ask leading questions.
The witness: I think so.

827

829
830

A. I do not think I got a copy of the paper
at that time. I went to Mr. McCullough's office
about a week after the accident. I did not sign
any papers at all in McCullough's office.
Cross Examination by Mr. McCullough: My
brother is working for Mr. Clarence York in the
barber shop at Orem. Mr. York and I were very
close pals. I am thirty years of age now. I was
22 at the time of the accident. I am positive that
the only paper I ever signed when Mr. Spencer
was present was the contract down in Orem. I remember Shirley Erickson signed the same paper.
That is the only time Mr. Spencer ever contacted
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me with reference to signing a paper. I am sure
that is correct as it is clear in my mind.
(The witness was shown defendant's Exhibit
7). That is my signature and Shirley Erickson's
signature. (The witness was shown defendant's
Exhibit 4). That is the signature of Mr. York.
You told us, a moment ago, you only signd
one paper with Mr. Spencer?
A. Down there?
Q. You told us you never signed a paper ~n
my office?
A. Yes sir.
Q. You told me you never signed a paper while
Mr. Spencer was there except the one you signed
dorwn there?
A. Yes sir.
Q. That is your signature, isn't it.'?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And that is Mr. Clar.ence York's signature?
A. Yes sir.
Q. This is Mr. Shirley Erickson's signature,
isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Swenson, isn't it
a fact, without quibbling about the situation, that
these are the three signatures to the two pieces of
paper that were signed down in Or.em when Mr.
Sid Spencer came down there?
Q. Isn't that true, Mr. Swenson?
A. Yes sir.
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Q. So, as a matter of fact, you have forgotten
all about the nature of the paper you signed,
haven't you~ Isn't that correct
A. Well, I remember signing a con tract.
Q. Mr. Swenson, isn't it a fact that you
haven't had anything to refresh your memory on
what you signed eight years ago, except your
conscious memory here now~
A. Yes sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact that is the document, refreshing your memory, the first document you
signed down there when Mr. Spencer was there
with Mr. Elmo Erickson-! mean Elmo Christensen, Louise's brother~
A. I thought it was only one paper, and all
three signed it.
Q. Mr. York was driving your car, wasn't he~
A. Yes.
Q. Don't you recall that they wanted the
driver's statement separate from the guests' statements~ Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Don't you remember that is the reason
why they put Mr. York's statement separately,
and yours and Mr. Erickson's statements separately, because of the fact you were in the position
of guests, and he was the driver of the automobile1
A. Yes sir.

I talked with Mr. Boren C. Christensen, the
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father of Louise Christensen either Tuesday or
Wednesday following the Sunday the accident occurred. I had not seen Mr. Spencer up to that
time. Mr. Christensen told me at that time along
with Mr. Clarence York, and Shirley Erickson
that he had b.een up to Mr. McCullough's office
and had employed Mr. McCullough to represent
his daughter, Louise.
MR. DOUGLAS: That conversation was before or after you had first seen Sid Spencer 1
A. That was before.
Q. Now, this matter, then, was discussed between you three boys and Mr. Christensen, the
father of Louise Christensen, as early as Tuesday or Wednesday of that week-of the week of
the accident, wasn't iU

A. Yes.
Q. You didn't see Mr. Spencer until the latter part of the week 1

A. No sir.

Q. When Mr. Spencer came down, isn't it a
fact he took down your testimony, what you knew
about the accident, in longhand?
A. Yes sir.
839

Q. And then after he took it down in longhand
you signed iU Do you recall thaU
A. Yes sir.
Q. Then later he gave you a typewritten copy
of it, and you signed the typewritten copy of iU
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A. I don't ever remember of him ever giving
me a copy of it.
Q. You remember signing a typewritten copy
of what the longhand notes disclosed~
A. I don't remember.
Q. The only time that you ever put your
name on any paper, by that I mean Mr. Spencer's
statement, was once, wasn't it~
A. Yes sir.
Q. There isn't any question but what that is
your signature, is there~
A. No sir.
Q. On this defendant's Exhibit 7~
A. No.
Q. I never, at any time, guaranteed or promised to give you a thousand dollars, did I~
A. No sir.
Q. I never made any statement to you, at any
time, how much I would give you, or how much
I would get you, did I~
A. Maybe you didn't.
Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Swenson, that the check
which you signed was a check made out by the
railroad, that is, the D. & R. G.~
A. Yes sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact that the D. & R. G. Railroad
sent me a check, and you signed it~
A. Yes sir.
Q. Nobody forced you to sign it, did they~
A. No sir.
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Q. At that time you were primarily interested
m seeing Louise Christensen taken care of, because of the nature of her injuries, weren't you~
A. Well, I was told if I didn't take that, that
Miss Christensen might not get anything.

840

MR. YOUNG: Do you know who told you
thaU
A. Mr. McCullough.
MR. DOUGLAS: Who~
A. Mr. Verne McCullough.

Q. Mr. Swenson, isn't it a fact that I told
you if you didn't take that you would have to go
to court~
A. Yes sir.

Q. And niay not get anything~
A. Yes sir.
Q. I didn't say that Louise Christensen
wouldn't get anything~
A. You said if they didn't get a fair settlement without Miss Christensen being with them,
to take it to court, you might beat it.
Q. I never predicated the acceptance of your
two hundred sixty-six dollars upon what Miss
Christensen would get.
A. No sir.
Q. Of course not. In other words, I told you
if it wasn't acceptable, that the only thing you
could do was to get a lawyer and go to court. Isn't
that true?
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A. Yes, but you didn't want to take it to
court ...

Q. And the two doctors you employed yo,urself, they said you had nothing but a bruise?
A. Yes sir.
Q. You came to my of~ice, the thr,ee of you, to
go over the evidence when we were preparing Miss
Christensen's case for trial?
A. Yes sir.
Q. You think that was the first time you came
to my offic:e?

A. Yes sir.
Q. You remember at that time I told you that
I would-when the matter of settlement was mentioned, I made the statement to you I would take
your case, and these other two boys, on the same
basis as I did Louise Christensen's?
A. Well, I thought you took the three of
them, all three, and Miss Christensen's without
ours.
Q. Have you seen Miss Christensen's contract?
A. No.

Q. Isn't it a fact I told you and Mr. Christensen if I settled the case without suit, I would get
33;1 per cent, and aft,er suit was started, the complaint was filed, it would be 50 per cent; do you
remember that?
A. Yes sir.

!I
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Q. You remember I told you I would take
your cases on the same basis f
A. Yes sir.
Q. And no contracts were ever signed in my
officef
A. No sir.
Q. And no contracts were ever mentioned out845
side of this conversation in my office, were they?
A. I don't think so.
Q. (By Mr. McCullough): That Exhibit, Defendant's Exhibit 7, is a true and correct statement of your version of the accident, is it not,
Mr. Swenson f
A. Yes sir.
Q. And it is just exactly as you understood
the accident occurred f
846
A. Yes sir.
NO. II
(Subdivision (g)-Sutfin)
R. Verne McCullough is charged with soliciting employment personally from Katherine Sutfin. The factual testimony is as follows:
Subd. (g)HOMER E. GROVE, a witness for the prosecution.
Direct Examination: I reside at Las Vegas,
Nevada. On October 8th, 1935, I was a deputy
sheriff of Clark County, Nevada. On that date
about 3:30 a.m. Sheriff Keate of that county instructed me to intercept a truck on the Highway
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No. 91 coming from St. George. Mrs. Katherine
Sutfin, two children, Mrs. Sutfin's husband's
45-6 corpse, and a young man were in the truck. They
were coming to Las Vegas, Nevada from St.
George. I requested them to come to the police
station. A short time later Mr. McCullough and
Mr. Spencer drove up in an automobile.
A. I had very little conversation with him
(Mr. McCullough) at that time, other than just
an introduction to him, and he asked to use a
private room in the police station, and talked to
Mrs. Sutfin, and I did not go into the private room
48
at all.
I could not hear what the conversation was.
49-50 Mr. Spencer did not take part in the conversation.
I cannot remember the exact conversation I had
with Mr. McCullough. It has been over two years
ago. I remember him explaining to me that he
had arrived in St. George too late to see these
50-1 people, and someone called Sheriff Keate to intercept them there. I heard a portion of the conversation between Mr. McCullough and Mrs. Sut52
fin. As I best recall it, it was pertaining to the
people in St. George, who had been advising her
and assisting her-that they were all affiliated
with the power company, or friends of the power
company and would not give her a square deal ...
I believe Mr. McCullough made that statement.
53
I could not say in what connection Ellis Pickett's
name was mentioned. She (Mrs. Sutfin) advised

I'll
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Mr. McCullough that she would not assign the
case to him until after she had seen her attorneys
53
in Phoenix, who were friends of the family.
Cross Examination: I received the telephone
call from my superior officer, Mr. Keate. He told
55
me he had received a call from a State officer at
Santa Clara.
Subd. (g)GERALD BLAKE, a witness for the prosecution.
Direct Examination: I reside at St. George,
Utah. On or about October 8, 1935, I drove a truck
from St. George to Las Vegas in which Mrs. Katherine Sutfin was a passenger with her two chil57-8 dren and the dead body of her husband. Our destination was Phoenix. We were stopped by Homer Grove, the deputy sheriff. And he took me to
the police station and held me until Mr. McCullough came, and he held me on the ground that
58
there was a call came from Utah to have me stop
for investigation, or something. I don't remember
what it was all said to be, but, anyway, I was
59
stopped for that one reason. Mr. Grove took us
over to breakfast. After breakfast we met Mr.
McCullough and Mr. Spencer. There was a con59
versation between Mr. McCullough and Mrs. Sutfin. It has been so long I have forgotten most of
that conversation. In fact, I have forgotten the
biggest part of it . ... He said that he had come
down from Salt Lake, and that he would like to in-
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terview her, and they went in and talked. And that
he had come down and would like to get the case,
and would like to know what she had done about
it-if she had hired anybody, and I don't reme'lrlrber much more about it. I walked out of the office.
In just a few moments Mrs. Sutfin came out and
got in the truck. Mr. McCullough came over to
side of truck. Mrs. Sutfin said she was undecided
what to do.
A. The reason she was undecided what to do was
that she had had an attorney in Phoenix that had
done some work before, and she wanted to consult
him. She tells Mr. McCullorugh that she would like
to think this thing over and see what she would do
about it, and he said he would go ahead and investigate the case and then ·they would correspond
back and forth from Phoenix to Salt Lake and then
we pulled out . ...
She (Mrs. Sutfin) said she was afraid that
maybe Mr. McCullough had been paid by the Dixie
Power Company to come down there and buy her
off. That was the very words she said.
Cross Examination:
Q. You said something about she (Mrs. Sutfin) inquired about whether somebody was connected with the power company-Dixie Power
Company.
A. Well, she was afraid of every lawyer in the
State of Utah.
Q. Did she say that?
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A. Yes, she told me that. And she had known
this fellow in Phoenix - he was taking a case before for her, and she knew him, and she was going
to consult him ...
Q. Did she say anything about that she had
refused to hire Mr. Pickett because he was connected with the Dixie Power Company?
A. Well, she said this much, that she was not
going to hire anybody until she got down there,
and then she would find o,ut what to do . ..
A. The only thing I remember her saying
about Mr. Pickett was that Mrs. Hail tried to get
her to get Mr. Pickett.
Q. Did she say that she would not get him.'!!
A. No, she did not. She said she was afraid
of all of them, and she would go down ther.e and
think this thing over when she had a little time,
and decide what she was going to do.
Q. Did she say that she wmtld not hire any
lawyer, and would not until she got to Phoenix?
A. What was your question'#
Q. All right-did she say anything about that
she had not and would not hire any lawy.er?
A. She said she had not consulted any lawyer.
Q. That she had not?
A. Yes.

Subd. (g)ELLIS J. PICKETT, a witness for the prosecution.
Direct Examination: I am an attorney at law
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residing at St. George, Utah. I was in Salt Lake
at the time of the accident. Mr. Hail of the Liberty Hotel called me up and I went over and saw
Mrs. Sutfin the evening before she left for Phoenix. I made an investigation of the accident and
had some pictures taken. At about 11 o'clock the
same morning Mrs. Sutfin left for Phoenix I saw
Mr. McCullough who had just arrived back from
Las Vegas. I told Mr. McCullough at that time
that Mrs. Sutfin had employed me to handle that
case for her and he said he had talked with her at
Las Vegas and she had not employed him but he
had told her he would make some investigation
for her. Mr. McCullough told me that Mrs. Sutfin
told him that she had not employed anyone. I did
not participate in any negotiations for settlement
or anything of that sort. I do not recall ever receiving any word from Mrs. Sutfin after she left
St. George.

Cross Exarn.ination:
I saw a letter from Mrs. Sutfin to Mrs. Hail
in which Mrs. Sutfin said she had not employed
me. She said she had employed som.e Phoenix lawyers and I wrote them and told them of my con79-80 nection with the case.
Q. And in that letter she said that she had
never employed you?

A. As I recall it, I think that was true, that
she said that, yes.
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Q. But in that particular she was wrong~
80
A. Yes.
I never made any formal contract with Mrs.
Sutfin. It was a verbal contract. After Mr. McCullough got a formal contract from Mrs. Sutfin,
he talked with me about paying for the work I had
80
done on the case. He said he would try and get it
for me. I wrote a letter on November 7, 1935 (Defendant's Exhibit "1") to Lewkowitz & Zaversack, Mrs. Sutfin's attorneys at Phoenix. In that
letter I said in part :
"Mr. Hail of the Hotel L~oerty has handed me
your letter of November 4th, in which you state
82
that Mrs. Sutfin has employed your office to represent her in the matter of the death of her husband and she advised you that she had not employed any attorney, especially me (Mr. Pickett)
83
to repres.ent her."
Subd. (g)BEN LINGENFELTER, a witness for the
435

436

defense.
Direct Examination by Mr. McCullough: I am
employed by the International Harvester Company. I formerly was associated with the State of
Utah Highway Patrol. Prior to that I was Assistant athletic coach at the University of Utah
under Coach Armstrong. I met Mr. McCullough
shortly after coming to Salt Lake in 1925. In October of 1935 I was assigned to the checking station at Santa Slara, Utah. At that time I resided
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at the Liberty Hotel at St. George. I recall the
accident on October 5, 1935, in which Mr. Sutfin
was killed on Highway No. 91 in the vicinity of
St. George. After the inquest I heard a conversation between Mrs. Hail of the Liberty Hotel and
Mrs. Sutfin with reference to the employment of
lawyers. After the conversation Mrs. Hail told
me that Mrs. Sutfin would prefer to get an outside lawyer in the case and suggested Mr. McCullough and Harley Gustin. Mrs. Hail asked me to
call Mr. McCullough or Harley Gustin. I called
Mr. McCullough on the telephone. In discussing
the employment of lawyers with Mrs. Hail, I believe, as I remember, the problem came up that
McCullough had handled more cases of this type
than Gustin, and he would probably be more suitable. I don't recall anything that was said between Mrs. Hail and Mrs. Sutfin relative to Mrs.
Sutfin's attitude toward any local attorney.
Q. When you called me (McCullough) on the
telephone, what did you say, in substance?
A. Well, in substance, I simply asked you to
come down and talk to this lady-that Mrs. Hail
had asked me to call you at her suggestion, and
Mrs. Hail had been more or less trying to help this
poor woman out, and in my estimation it looked
like a case against the Southern Utah Power Company, and that somebody should come down there
and take care of it, because I believed that this
woman was entitled to some sort of remuneration.
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About three or four o'clock the next mornng
I saw Mr. McCullough at the Santa Clara checking station. It was about an hour and a half or
two hours after Mrs. Sutfin had left for Phoenix,
Arizona. I remember asking Mr. McCullough why
in the world he had not arrived earlier in the evemng.
Q. Did you make any suggestions with reference to contacting Mrs. Sutfin?
A. Yes.
Q. And what suggestion did you make?
A. That I could probably call Sheriff K eateI believe his name was-at Las Vegas, and ask
him to stop her and tell her that the attorney that
she was waiting fo,r in St. George would come on
down there and meet her, and to wait for him.
Q. And who made that suggestion about calling the sheriff?
A. I did.
Q. Did I even suggest it at all?
A. N o-I would not say that you had.
Q. Now, did you call the sheriff at Las Vegas?
A. Yes sir.
Q. State what you told the sheriff at Las
Vegas¥
A. As near as I can remember, I told Sheriff
Keate that this lady was going down there with
her two youngsters, and a driver, in a Chevrolet
truck, as I remember it, and her husband's body
was in the back end of this truck, which, as I re-
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member, was a flat platform truck, an that there
was an attorney here that would like to talk to
that lady, and would he tell her to wait for him
in Las Vegas; and, as I remember it, he said he
would. As I remember, Sheriff Keate replied that
he would stop this truck.
Q. Did you ever tell the sheriff of Clark
County, Mr. Keate, that this lady, Mrs. Sutfin,
was wanted for investigation by the Utah officials~
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A. No, I tried to be very careful in explaining
to him the situation, because I did not think there
was any reason why that he could legally hold her
for anything.
Q. Then after that conversation you saw me
leave in a car for Las Vegas~
A. You left in that direction. That is as far
as I know.
Q. Is that the only thing that you recall about
my presence at that time; that is, is that what you
recall of the situation~
A. I believe that is about the story.
Cross Examinatioot: In the conversation between Mrs. Sutfin and Mrs. Hale I did not hear
any discussion about Mr. Pickett. I am positive
that we (Mrs. Hail and I) discussed both Verne
McCullough and Harley G1.tstin, and that I called
McCullough after discussing the circumstances as
to the probable efficiency or proficiency, comparatively of the two men, and that Mrs. Hail told me
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to go ahead and call McCullough then. Mrs. Hail
personally knew Harley Gustin and she knew Mr.
McCullough by reputation. After I talked with
Mr. McCullough on the telephone I told Mrs. Sut450 fin and Mrs. Hail that he was coming down. Mrs.
Sutfin waited there quite a while that evening for
451
Mr. McCullough before she left with her husband's
body. I had not heard that Mrs. Sutfin had retained a local attorney previmts to my calling Mr.
454
McCullough. vVhen Mr. McCullough arrived at
the Santa Clara station I told him that Mrs. Sutfin
had gone on to Las Vegas, and although I suggested I could have Sheriff Keate stop her and tell her
that McCullough was coming to Las Vegas, Mr.
McCullough was rather indifferent about going to
Las Vegas, but upon my suggestion he decided to
456
go and I called Sheriff Keate to inform Mrs. Sut461
fin. I never called Mr. McCullough before or since
on any case or any litigation. I have never received any money whatsoever relative to this case and
I reported the entire incident to my superior of462
ficer who approved my conduct.
Subd. (g)446

R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for
the defense.
Direct Examination: This accident occurred
on October 5, 1935. I learned of this case the first
time on October 7, 1935. After luncheon on that
day, Ben Lingenfelter phoned me from St. George
and stated that the widow of Mr. Sutfin who had
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been killed had requested Mrs. Hail of the Liberty
Hotel to have me come down on this particular
case. He stated it would be necessary to come as
quickly as possible as they contemplated taking
the body to Phoenix, Arizona. I told him I was
in court that afternoon but would come down as
soon as possible. I rode down to St. George with
Mr. Sid Spencer in his automobile. We arrived
there between two and three o'clock in the morning. Upon arriving in St. George, we went to the
Liberty Hotel and talked with Mrs. Hail. She
stated Mrs. Sutfin had requested her to telephone
me and that she had waited practically all night
and had decided I was not coming; that she had
left for Phoenix. Mrs. Hail advised me that Mr.
Lingenfelter was at the checking station at Santa
Clara. I went over and talked to Mr. Lingenfelter
who stated that the woman had gone on about an
hour before. I told him I was sorry but I could
not get there sooner. Mr. Lingenfelter suggested
that he would call the Sheriff at Las Vegas to
have him intercept Mrs. Sutfin and tell her we
were on the road to Las Vegas. I thanked him
for this courtesy. Mr. Lingenfelter put in a call
to the Sheriff at Las Vegas and told him that the
attorney Mrs. Sutfin had requested to come down
from Salt Lake was on the road over there and
asked him if he would give that information to
Mrs. Sutfin who was traveling in a truck with
her two little children, a young man and her hus-
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band's corpse. I heard him tell the Sheriff to tell
Mrs. Sutfin that we would meet her at the police
station. Mr. Spencer and I then drove to Las
Vegas. We arrived there about seven o'clock in
the morning. Mrs. Sutfin and her children were
over eating breakfast. When she came back from
breakfast we went into a private room in the police station. I could see that she was all upset.
She first asked me if I was connected with the
Southern Utah Power Company otherwise known
as the Dixie Power Company. I told her I was
not connected with any power company. She then
asked me about Mr. Pickett-if he was connected
with the company. I told her I did not know a
thing about Mr. Pickett and did not care to discuss the merits or demerits of any lawyer. I asked
her if she had employed Mr. Pickett and she said
absolutely not, that she had not employed anybody.
She said she was afraid of any lawyer in Southern
Utah on account of their connection with the power
company. I told Mrs. Sutfin she was in no condition to employ a lawyer. I told her to go on into
Phoenix and after her husband's funeral, I would
be very pleased to discuss the matter with her. I
further told her that on the road back I would get
all the evidence available. I told her she could
have this evidence if she desired to employ an attorney in Phoenix or if her people there wanted
their own attorney. About this time Mr. Grove,
the deupty sheriff, sent a piece of paper in to her
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and she showed it to me. The statement said,
''Please do not hire McCullough. We have a lawyer for you.'' I advised Mrs. Sutfin not to hire
any lawyer but to go on to Phoenix and get her
husband's body buried and then write me as to
what she intended to do in the matter. She then
went out and got in the truck and left for Phoenix.
I went back to St. George and made a thorough
investigation of the accident. I talked with Mr.
Ashley of the Miller Garage who informed me
that Mr. Pickett had been taking pictures of the
car at the scene of the accident on that day, October 8th, notwithstanding the accident occurred on
October 5th. Mr. Ashley told me he had towed
the car back to the scene of the accident for the
purpose of these pictures. I then went over to
Mr. Pickett's office and he told me that Mrs. Sutfin had talked with him the night b,efore she left for
Phoenix but had not given him a contract. I told
Mr. Pickett she had not employed me and explained to him how I happened to come down to St.
George. I told him that I had not been employed
except to make an investigation. On October 9th,
1935, when I returned to Salt Lake City, I sent
Mrs. Sutfin a letter, a copy of which is marked
"Defendant's Exhibit 18" and is set out in the
transcript. I received a letter from Lewkowitz &
Zaversack bearing date of October 16, 1935. (This
letter is marked Exhibit 19 and set out in the
transcript on page 812.) This letter stated that
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they had been employed to represent Mrs. Sutfin
and the writer of the letter thanked me on behalf
of Mrs. Sutfin for my former kindnesses to her.
I next heard from Mrs. Sutfin on November 30,
1935, when I received a telegram asking me to
meet her in St. George-defendant's "Exhibit 17"
set out in the transcript on page 808. I did not
go to St. George. Mrs. Sutfin came to Salt Lake
City and employed me to represent her in the case.
She showed me a letter from attorneys Lewkowitz
and Zaversack dated November 29th, 1935, in
which they released her from any obligation as
far as they were concerned and stated they had
813
withdrawn as attorneys from the case. This letter
813
is Exhibit 21. She had Lewkowitz & Zaversack's
files of correspondence in the case. I then entered
into a written contract (Defendant's Exhibit No.
22) with Mrs. Katherine Sutfin. I did not author814 ize any person to solicit this case for me and nobody did solicit the case for me.
Subd. (d-e-f-g)-

R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for
the defense.
Cross Examination: During the years 1930
to 1936 Mr. Spencer did investigation work for me
854-6 on cases which came into my office. I paid him
on the quantum meruit or what I thought was a
fair value for the work he did for me on each case.
857
Our practice was to settle with Mr. Spencer from
time to time. We went over the work he had done
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during a given period and arrived at a figure
which we felt was fair. We then struck a balance.
He drew money when he needed it. I would pay
him different amounts on account as he requested
it. I also paid him checks for expenses which he
incurred, which accounts for checks of odd
amounts. I have submitted all the checks I could
find that were made payable to Sid Spencer. (A
list of checks set out on page 922 of transcript.)
The quality of Mr. Spencer's service was a factor
in determining his compensation for his investigation work.
Occasionally Mr. Spencer did other work for
me such as filing papers and extra stenographic
work. He worked for other people and other lawyers during that period. He investigated cases
for dozens of lawyers. I understood he investigated, or contemplated investigating one for you
(Mr. Rogers). I may be mistaken, that may be
another one of those rumors. I have never heard
from any reliable sources that Mr. Spencer had
solicited for me. I have heard a lot of things from
you (Mr. Rogers) or your kind about Spencer being an ambulance chaser. Mr. Spencer paid onethird of the office rental of the entire suite, onethird of the telephone bill and one-third of the
stenographer's expense. Mr. Spencer never at any
time indicated he was soliciting business for me.
Mr. Spencer vacated the room in connection with
our offices in the spring of 1937.
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Q. (By Mr. Rogers): Do you still employ
him to investigate matters~
A. I haven't employed Mr. Spencer for some
time.
Q. Now, he was a very thorough, expert Investigator, wasn't he~
A. Yes, one of the best in the business.
Q. Why did you discontinue his services, Mr.
McCullough~
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A. Because Mr. Tingey, who was the former
president of the Bar Association talked with
me about the relationship between Mr. Spencer and myself, and he stated that there had
been some complaints come to the Bar Association, and he said, the fact that Mr. Spencer is in
the adjoining office, in the same suite of offices,
it may be due to the fact that you have used him
so many times in your cases that it lends a lot of
color to these rumors about the fact he is chasing
cases for you; and I said, Mr. Tingey, so far as
I am concerned, if the Bar Association feels as
you feel, I don't want that situation to continue.
For that reason, I notified Mr. Spencer that
I prefer he make another business connection and
eliminate that situation entirely, so far as I was
concerned.
However, subsequent to that time there had
been a number of cases which he had investigated
for me, and naturally they were finished in the
course of time.
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I feel there has been an absolute injustice to
him, on occasions of that kind, due to the factI mean the rumors which are not predicated upon
facts at all. However, Mr. Spencer was in his
own office before he came down to our suit of
offices. He had an office in the Deseret National
Bank Building, and functioned under the same
name. He has been functioning now for a year,
now, in exactly the same situation. I seem to be
the only one anybody seems to be interested in.
865
That is the thing I can't understand.
I handled a great number of cases in the District Court of Salt Lake County during the period
from May 14th, 1932 to July 1st, 1937. I can not
say whether that number reached 154 personal in937
jury cases or not as indicated by "Exhibit J." A
lot of these cases set forth in ''Exhibit J'' are
940 not personal injury cases.
Subd. ( d, e, f, g)L. 0. THOMAS, a witness for the prosecution.
This witness identified ''Exhibit J'' as a list
of cases which he took off of the docket of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County;
941 "Exhibit J" admitted in evidence.
No. III
(Subdivisions (1) and (m)-Harry Erickson)
So that your Honorable Court will be fully
apprised of the nature of these two charges, we
set them out verbatim:
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"(1) That on, to-wit, the 8th day of March,
1937, there was pending in the City Court of Salt
Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
a criminal action entitled' State of Utah vs. Harry
E. Erickson' and the said R. Verne McCullough
was then attorney for the said Harry E. Erickson.
That at said time the said Harry E. Erickson had
been released by the court to the custody of the
said R. Verne McCullough, his attorney. That on
or about said date a bench warrant for the arrest
of the said Harry E. Erickson was issued by the
court, the said Harry E. Erickson having failed
to appear for hearing in said criminal action.
That thereafter, although the said R. Verne McCullough well knew the whereabouts of the said
Harry E. Erickson in the State of Califo.rnia, the
said R. Verne McCullough refused and failed to
divulge to the court or to the sheriff's office or to
the office of the Salt Lake County Attorney the
whereabouts of the said Harry E. Erickson.
"(m) That on or about the 13th day of April,
1937, in the City of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the
said R. Verne McCullough did testify as a witness in his own behalf having been duly sworn to
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth, in a certain proceeding entitled, 'The State
of Utah ex rel. B. P. Leverich, City Judge vs. R.
Verne McCullough,' in which the said R. Verne
McCullough did testify falsely and in said testi-
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mony did state as true matter in substance as
follows:

" 'I told Erickson not to, leave before he saw
me.'
" 'I didn't see Erickson again or talk with
him again after the morning of Thursday, the 4th
of March.'
" 'I don't know wher.e Erickson is except that
I was informed that he had relatives some place
in California, and I imagine that he is with them.'
''That in truth and in fact the said R. Verne
McCullough did see and did talk to Harry E. Erickson on the 5th day of March, 1937, and did then
advise and counsel the said Harry E. Erickson to
immediately leave the State of Utah.
''That in truth and in fact the said R. Verne
McCullough knew the address and telephone number of the said Harry E. Erickson in Riverside,
California, at the time the said R. Verne McCullough testified on the said 13th day of April,
1937."
The factual testimony is as follows :
Subd. (1, m)R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for
the defense.
(No testimony of this witness is abstracted
except on sustained charges.)
Direct Examination: I am an attorney at
law and have been since 1920. I am a graduate
of the University of Utah and Stanford Univer-
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sity. I represented the defendant in the case of
"State of Utah, plaintiff, vs. Harry Erickson,
defendant," filed in the Salt Lake City Court on
or about the 8th day of February, 1937, Case No.
22738, District Court No. 10501. (Files in evidence 17-26-388). The defendant was charged
with the crime of carnal knowledge on the person
of Beth Standing, age 13 years. I appeared for
Erickson in said court on said February 8th,
1937. Defendant could not furnish bond and I informed Judge Leverich I had previously represented defendant in a civil matter and knew defendant's father and family-his father and family having a good reputation. It was my understanding that Judge Leverich released the defendant on his own recognizance. The court record
shows that he was released in my custody and
I am not attempting to negative the record. The
preliminary hearing was set for February 24th
in the Erickson case. Pursuant to stipulation and
while I was in the State of California, Mr. Harold ~Wallace, County Attorney, appeared before
Judge Leverich on the 24th of February and had
the preliminary hearing continued until the 4th
of March, 1937. At 9:30a.m. March 4th, Mr. Harold Wallace informed me that he had talked with
Mr. Lawrence Standing, the father of the prosecutrix, and his attorney, Mr. Nicholas G. Morgan,
and that he had decided to dismiss the action, on
the condition that Harry Erickson leave town.
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I thereupon used Mr. \Vallace's telephone and
called Mr. Erickson, the defendant, and told him
the County Attorney was going to dismiss the
action providing he left the State of Utah, but
I expressly told him not to leave until he saw me.
Erickson agreed to the condition of the dismissal
and stated he would be up to my office and see
me that afternoon. That same morning at ten
o'clock the County Attorney moved to dismiss the
action against Harry E. Erickson for lack of evidence. The motion was denied and the court continued the case until March 5th, indicating he
would reconsider the motion for dismissal. March
5th, the court refused to change his ruling, and
the County Attorney not having a medical witness
available, the court continued the hearing until
Saturday, March 6th, at 10:00 o'clock. On that
date the County Attorney again renewed his motion to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. The
motion was denied. In my four years experience
as a prosecutor and fifteen years as a defending
lawyer, I have not had the experience of a judge
refusing to dismiss a case upon the motion of the
prosecution. It is my understanding of the law
that the sole prerogative of dismissing such a case
was with the prosecution, and that Judge Leverich
as a committing magistrate, had no power to refuse to grant the prosecutor's motion. I was willing to yield obedience to Judge Leverich's ruling
notwithstanding I felt he was in error.
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I did not see the defendant on Thursday,
March 4th, as I went to Ogden on that afternoon.
I did not see the defendant on March 5th. My
stenographer informed him of the judge's decision and to be present in Judge Leverich's court
on Saturday, March 6th at 10:00 o'clock a.m. when
I was going to make a motion for a change of judge
by reason of prejudice of Judge Leverich. On
the 6th of March I appeared in Judge Leverich's
court and moved for a change of judge on the
grounds of prejudice. The judge granted the motion and forthwith transferred the case to Judge
A. H. Ellett. The defendant did not appear in
court that morning, notwithstanding he had been
told by my stenographer the day before to be
there. In the absence of Judge Ellett, the County
Attorney and I agreed to appear before Judge
Ellett Monday, March 8th, for further proceedings in the case. On the afternoon of Saturday,
March 6th, without my knowledge, Judge Ellett
issued a bench warrant for the defendant and
fixed his bail in the sum of $10,000. This information was first conveyed to me by Judge Ellett
on Monday, March 8th, when I approached him
in his small claims court with reference to the
defendant's case. At that time he asked me if I
knew about the defendant leaving the state. I told
Judge Ellett at that time that I did not know anything about the defendant leaving the state and
that if he had left the state there must be some
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misunderstanding on his part. I told Judge Ellett
the only thing I ever told the defendant was what
the County Attorney told me. The last time I
talked with him was on Thursday morning, March
4th, over the telephone when I informed him the
County Attorney was going to dismiss the action
providing he left town, but I expressly told him
not to go until he saw me. I told Judge Ellett
that I knew the defendant did not leave town on
Thursday and Friday because he had been in my
office and talked with my stenographer who had
informed him of the progress of the case. Following my conversation with Judge Ellett on
March 8th, 1937, I went back to my office and
telephoned Mrs. Clyde J. Davison, a sister-inlaw of the defendant, as to Harry Erickson's
whereabouts. She was reluctant about saying anything about the situation so I asked her to have
her husband come up to my office as soon as
possible. After luncheon they came to my office.
They told me the defendant had left for California Saturday morning. They did not disclose
to me where I could locate him. They said: «Undoubtedly he will probably stop at some of his
relatives," and I said, «Well, can you give me any
information as to where I can locate hirn, because
he has got to return." I said, «He would be a
fttgitive." They said, «We will get in touch with
him and have him call you," and I said, "You
have hint call rne any tirne at night, station to sta-
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tion and I will be home" and they said that they
would call their relatives in California and try
to locate him. On that day, March 8th, I wrote a
letter to Reed Callister of the law firm of Cannon
and Callister, who office in the Bank of America
646-7 building at Los Angeles. I had previously told
the defendant that Mr. Callister and Mr. Cannon
had radio connections in Southern California and
that if he went to California after his case was
over they could undoubtedly help him get a position as the defendant was a very fine musician.
647
(See letter, p. 331 of transcript, Exhibit G.)
On the night of March 9th, or the early morning of March lOth, 1937, I received a station to
station telephone call from Erickson. He did not
649
disclose to me his whereabouts in Los Angeles but
said he was going under an assumed name. (See
614
affidavit of Reed E. Callister of Los Angeles for
corroboration). He told me his sister-in-law had
called and requested him to call me and I told him
- I asked him why he had left town and he stated
he was sick and tired of the case, that the judge
was prejudiced against him, that he had been reliably informed the Standings wanted the case
dismissedr---that they would not extradite, and that
he had just left town. I never talked with Stand649
ings about this case except the conversation I had
with Lawrence Standing in the presence of Judge
Leverich in his chambers on the morning of March
650 4th. I told the defendant there was only one thing,
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left to do and that was to get back here and see
this thing through; that I had every reason to believe that Mr. Wallace would renew the mo1tion to
dismiss. I told him he had no reason to disappear
and leav.e for California and that I was sure that
if he would come back voluntarily his case would
not be prejudiced if the matter was reasonably
explained to the court. II e said, "I am not coming
back.'' I asked him where I could locate him and
he stated he was no,t disclosing his whereabouts
to anybody. On the evening of March 25th after
12 midnight, the telephone rang and upon answering the same I learned that the defendant was on
the other end of the wire. He stated he had a very
unpleasant experience that day, when he went up
to the Musicians Union to register for work in
the state of California; that he had given them
his correct name and was informed that a couple
of deputy sheriffs from Los Angeles County had
been looking for him; that he did not know what
to do and decided to telephone me. I told him that
he was going to be picked up and there was only
one thing to do about it, and that was to get back
here. II e then told me he had been informed the
Standings would absolutely refuse to extradite or
do anything to prosecute him. I told him the
Standings may not have anything to say about it,
and advised him to retu,rn to Utah. I told him if he
did not want my advice to consult Mr. Cannon or
Mr. Callister, the attorneys at Los Angeles. (See
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affidavit of Reed E. Callister, an attorney in Los
Angeles for corroboration of McCullough's testimony). Before I had a chance to ask him where
he was, he hung up the phone. In the station to
station long distance calls neither the identity of
the defendant nor his whereabouts was disclosed
to me by the telephone operator.
On April 13, 1937, I was cited before Judge
Leverich for contempt. On the 14th of April,
1937, I was found guilty of contempt for the alleged disobedience of the lawful orders of the
court in not having the defendant present on the
4th and 6th days of March, 1937. After having
been found guilty of contempt I made up my mind
I was going to get hold of this fellow Erickson,
find out where he was and go down there and get
him if I had to bring him back. On the afternoon
of April 14th, I contacted Mr. and Mrs. Clyde J.
Davison and told them it was absolutely imperative that I get the defendant's address. Mr. Davison gave me the address ·of his brother, M. G.
Davison at Riverside, California. He told me I
could probably locate the defendant through that
party. I put in a station to station call to the
residence of M. G. Davison on the night of April
14th. Mrs. M. G. Davison told me that Harry Erickson was not there but that she would try to
locate him. I told her it was very important that
I talk with Mr. Erickson and to have him phone
me at my expense. Later that night or the early
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morning of April 15th, Harry Erickson telephoned
me on a station to station call. He did not disclose his whereabouts. I told him about the contempt proceedings and having been found guilty
of contempt for his failure to appear in court. I
informed him that the authorities would bring him
back and again advised him to get back before
there was any more notoriety in the case. Erickson told me then he was not coming back to the
state of Utah and would never come back and hung
up the phone. I learned that Harry Erickson was
arrested in California the latter part of April
when I was in New York City. Upon my return
from New York I talked with Harry Erickson at
the County Jail on May 9th.
On the following day I got him out of jail on
bond by the order of Judge Schiller. I continued
to represent him until on or about the 20th of May
when my services were terminated upon my refusal to use perjured witnesses in support of a fake
alibi proposed by the defendant. (See affidavit
of Harold L. Gannett and Edna Gannett, his wife,
two witnesses Erickson solicited in an attempt to
support his perjured alibi.)
MR. McCULLOUGH: I would like to make
this statement as part of my own testimony-that
the reason I did not disclose to the court the conversations that I had with Mr. Erickson on the
telephone is because I was not asked for any telephone conversations, in the first place. In the
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second place, that it was my understanding, not
only of the rules of the Bar Association of the
State of Utah, but of the law which prescribes the
duty of an attorney to his client, which is to the
same effect, that I must maintain inviolate the
confidence at every peril to myself to preserve the
secr.ets of my client. I refer to subdivision 5 of
Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct, Utah State Bar Association, which reiterates
that statute as to the duty of an attorney to his
client with reference to confidential information.
MR. YOUNG: That is getting it down pretty
close, there.
MR. McCULLOUGH: Now, as to the third
point: I disclosed to the court every bit of information that was pertinent and that I had up to
the 14th of April, as to the whereabouts of Mr.
Erickson. I call your attention to the fact that on
page 80 (Exhibit 12) of my testimony which was
introduced by Mr. Rogers, I think it was asked
me:
Q. And you say you had a conversation with
Judge Leverich after this defendant was supposed
to have left, and talked with Judge Leverich about
his whereabouts~
A. Yes.
Q. At that time you told him that the defendant was in California~
A. I said that was my information, that he
was in California . .. I said, u I am going down to
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California the latter part of the month or the first
of next month, and I will look him up and advise
him to return;" and Judge Leverich said, "That
is the proper thing to do."
MR. ROGERS : Judge Ellett.
MR. McCULLOUGH: That is not correct;
that is a mistake. Judge Leverich said, "That is
the proper thing to do; that is what I would advise you to do.''
Q. You want the Court to understand that you
did not tell him that you knew where the defendant was at that time?
A. No, I did not tell him that. I don't know
now where he is. I don't know now where he is
(repeated) except by hearsay. I have not seen the
defendant. I don't know whether he is in California or not.
At the time I was testifying was either the
late afternoon of April 13th or the early morning
of April 14th, and I had not had the conversation
with him as I detailed, on the evening of April
14th, at this timeMR. DOUGLAS: You had talked with him on
the ninth.
MR. McCULLOUGH: Yes-and I told Judge
Leverich that it was my information he was in
California.
Then I call your attention again to my testimony, in answer to the question propounded by
Judge Leverich:
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Q. Isn't it a fact that you said to me that you
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wished that I would dismiss the case; that the defendant is down there, that you knew where he
was, and that you could get him back; and that
you were going down in a couple of weeks, and
that you would get him back1
A. I made this statement-not in that language, Judge-! don't want to be misunderstood.
Of course, when we are talking outside of the rules
of evidence, I may have used the statement about
that I knew he was in California. If that statement was made, it was made with the understanding I had information that he was in the State of
California. (Ex. 12, p. 82.)
And then I call your attention to additional
answer on page 83 :
A. I think, as I recall the exact language,
Judge, was that I was sorry the case was not dismissed. I may have used the expression that I
wished the case was dismissed, but certainly I
never had any right to anticipate that you would
dismiss it. I certainly never had any idea of making any request for the purpose of you dismissing
it, because I immediately told you I was going
down to California the latter part of the month, or
the first of next month, and would try to get hold
of the d.efendant and advise him to return to Utah
and fight the case . ...
MR. DOUGLAS: That is all in the record 1
MR. McCULLOUGH: (Continues, quoting):
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Q. Don't you recall saying you knew where
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he was, and you could get him? Do you recall that
statement?
A. I don't remember it in that language,
Judge. I r.emember I told you he was in California, that I could locate him, because I still think
I can locate him if he is there, because I know that
long before he ever left that was his intention, of
going to California.
Then in the latter part of it I stated again:
"I knew he was going to California." ... I think
I stated to you that he was down there with relatives, and I don't recall ever saying that I knew
where his relatives lived, because I didn't know.
I couldn't possibly have given the judge any
more information unless I had told him the source
of my information.
Now, I want to call the Commission's attention to two or three things that I think my testimony should contain: \¥hen I was questioned on
direct examination by Judge Lewis he asked me
the question: (Ex. 12, p. 51)
Q. Do you remember the incidents that occurred during the week beginning March the 1st
and ending March the 8th, with reference to one
Erickson who was under arrest? And that is the
subject matter which we were discussing at the
time of the contempt proceedings. And when this
controversy arose is related here in the transcript.

78
MR. ROGERS : Your answer is on 63, I think,
in the middle of the page.
MR. McCULLOUGH: When I made the answer to the question :
Q. Did you have any direct communication
with him at any time aft.er the morning of Thursday, March the 5th?

A. No, I never talked with Mr. Erickson after
the morning of Thursday, March the 4th, at 9:00
o'clock, 9:20 or 9:30 in the morning-! had reference at that time to the detailing of the events
of the particular we.ek prior to the time Har·ry
Erickson left town on Saturday morning.
MR. DOBBS: Your position is that that must
be considered in connection with its text, and if
the text shows-and that the nature of the questions then being asked you was of the character to
lead you to believe that you were not being interrogated with respect to anything occurring
after March 6th?
678

MR. McCULLOUGH: I wasn't ev:en asked
anything after that.
MR. H.ANSEN: At that time the offense of
contempt was complete, if he was guilty of contempt.
MR. DOBBS: Yes.
MR. McCULLOUGH: Next question: (Reads)
(Ex. 12, p. 63)
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Q. I will ask you, Mr. McCullough, whether
you have ever given Mr. Erickson any instructionsI think probably the correct word was "directions'' about leaving town, other than those
that you have now related to the court1
A. I have never given Mr. Erickson permission, as far as I am concerned, to leave town at
any time. On the contrary, my admonitions were
not to leave town until he saw me, and that was
given to him at approximately 9 :30 on March 4th.
There was nothing said about any subsequent
communication after the day he had left town. My
attention was nev.er called to any telephone conversation or about my having talked with him after that . ...
679

MR. McCULLOUGH: I call your attention
to page 76 ... (Ex. 12, p. 76)
Q. Why did you tell Mr. Erickson that he
would have to leave the state~

A. Because Mr. Wallace told me that was
condition on his dismissing the action ...
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JUDGE LEWIS: If the court please, it
seems to me that the witness is entitled to a little
fairer treatment than that. He stated that on
Thursday he told Erickson, in conforming to the
requirements of the County Attorney, that he
would have to leave town as a condition of the
dismissal. Now he is asked why he told him on
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Saturday mormng that he would have to leave
town.
Judge Lewis apparently got the thing all
mixed up-(continues quoting):
THE COURT: I did not understand the question that way.
JUDGE LEvVIS: It was at the time of the
order for the transfer to Judge Ellett.
THE COURT : I did not understand his question to be that.
Then originally the record read '' (Question
read)" but that was corrected by Mr. Otterstrom
in his testimony and he said that the record was
read, not the question read. The record was read.
And, to sat£sfy the dispute between the court
and Judge Lewis as to the last tim.e that week that
I had talked to him, I stated:
A. I never had any personal conversation
with Mr. Erickson after Thursday morning at
9:30.
And that is where Mr. Ottersirom corrects
the record now, by the way.
MR. THOMAS: The only place he corrected
it is that he says there, instead of " (Question
read) " "Record read."
MR. McCULLOUGH: Yes, and we had a discussion over it, and it was because Judge Lewis
got all balled up as to which day it was, that I told
him about the County Attorney saying that the
man would have to leave, and this is a volunteer
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statement, to satisfy Lewis and the. court just exactly what the situation was.
Cross Examination:
I did not tell Judge Leverich anything about
my telephone conversations with Erickson on the
9th and 25th days of March. I did not consider it
my duty to tell him or anyone else. Thes.e communications were confidential. If I had been asked the question as to whether I had talked with
Mr. Erickson I would have said yes, but would
have declined to answ.er what the communications
were. I never entertained any idea that they were
asking whether I had any communication from Mr.
Erickson either by telephone or otherwise after
March 8th, and consequently I had nothing in my
mind to differentiate between a telephone conversation and a personal conversation. I made an
effort to trace the long distance calls from Erickson but the telephone company informed me that
the information was available only to the person
placing the call and I could not get this information. When I made the answer, "I don't know
where he is now except by hearsay," at the contempt hearing on April 14th, I had reference to
Erickson's whereabouts at that time. I did not
know personally whether he was in California on
the 14th of April. I heard some rumors to the .effect that he was still in California which were
hearsay. I revealed every part of the information,
including what I had received from Erickson on the
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telephone, to Judge Leverich, as to the whereabouts of Erickson. I told Judge Leverich that I
intended to go down to California and bring Erickson back bodily if necessary.
Q. Let me ask you this: vVhy did you consider just the events of that week at that time~
A. Because that is all I was asked about. That
was the very first question that was asked me,
with reference to the events of that week, and the
entire discussion was on the events of that week,
and there was no issue in the contempt proceeding other than the events of that week. If you will
read the Judge's findings of fact and conclusions
of law and decree, there is nothing in issue except
the events of that week.
(Judgment of contempt read in evidence on
page 707.) This judgment states that I failed to
obey an order of the court made on the 24th day
of February, 1937, to have Harry E. Erickson in
court on the 4th day of March, 1937. (I was in
the State of California on the 24th day of February, 1937, and the County Attorney continued
the case on the 24th of February to the 4th day
of March, 1937). The other order I am supposed
to have disobeyed was not having the defendant
present in court on the 6th day of March, 1937.
The contempt proceedings had nothing to do with
anything else except these two orders.
(The Disciplinary Committee indicated the
testimony given by Harry E. Erickson in the per-
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jury case of" State of Utah, plaintiff vs. R. Verne
McCullough, defendant," filed in the Third ,Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, Case 10540 (Exhibit G), had been
successfully impeached by the defendant's witnesses and in their Findings decided (Wery material issue against the testimony of the said Harry
E. Erickson, a convicted felon, and in favor of R.
Verne McCullough. Therefore, the testimony of
Harry E. Erickson will not be reviewed herein
or the testimony of the following impeaching witnesses offered by R. Verne McCullough: Elmer
T. Ashton, Tr. 491, Jack Earl, Tr. 510, J. Leonard
Love, Tr. 518, Nicholas G. Morgan, Tr. 546, Ralph
B. Ottenheimer, Tr. 568, Elsie Gotez, Tr. 572, Lief
McManus, Tr. 580, Marian Christensen, Tr. 593,
Reed E. Callister, Tr. 614, Harold L. Gannett and
Edna Gannett, Tr. 616, Mrs. R. Verne McCullough, Tr. 620, and ,Jules Strongbow, page 425
of "Exhibit G." Testimony offered for and
against the charges not sustained by the Commission will not be reviewed.)
STATEMENT OF LAW AND ARGUMENT

Quantum of Proof Necessary in Disbarment Proceedings
''The summary proceeding of disbarment is
civil, not criminal, but requires more than a preponderance of the evidence. The guilt of the attorney must be cleaTly established."
In Re Evans & Rogers, 22 Utah 367
(first case)
"We content ourselves with placing our con-
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elusions upon the settled doctrine that unless a
case is made out, by clear and convincing proof of
guilt, no judgment of disbarment should go."
People vs. Tanquary, 48 Colo. 124;
109 Pac. 260.
''An accusation against an attorney in a disbarment proceedings is in the nature of a criminal charge, and all intendments are in favor of
the accused, and he should be given the benefit of
doubts arising from conflict of evidence.''
In Re Alameda County Bar Assn. (Calif.)
170 Pac. 432 at 433.
"The Court should never disbar a lawyer on
testimony of a doubtful character, but the charges
should be clearly sustained by convincing proof
and the proof must satisfy the court with reasonable certainty."
Thornton's Attorneys at Law, p. 1307
"An attorney, against whom disbarment proceedings have been preferred, is presumed to be
innocent and to have performed his duties faithfully and in accordance with his oath until the
contrary is clearly established.
Thornton's Attorneys at Law, p. 1309.
In Re Haymond, 121 Cal. 385; 53 Pac. 809.
TIME WITHIN WHICH PROCEEDINGS MUST
BE INSTITUTED:
As to the charges contained in Division I of this
Brief, the Court's attention is directed to the time when
the alleged offenses were committed; Subdivision (d)Wunderli, January 12, 1934, Subdivision (e)-Woodland,
October 24, 1933; Subdivision (f)-York, October 13,
1931.
The undisputed evidence shows that the first time
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these alleged offenses were called to the attention of the
plaintiff was on January 21st, 1938, approximately
four, five and seven years after the alleged misconduct.
The record is silent as to any excuse or justification for
the unreasonable delay in filing these charges.
"The ordinary statutes of limitation have no
application to disbarment proceedings. How.ever,
proceedings instituted after a great lapse of time,
from the commission of the act cmnplained of, are
regarded with disfa1Jor and the Court may refuse
to hear an application to disbar that has be,en unreasonably delayed."
5 American .T uris. 434
L. R. A. (1915 D) 1218;
45 A. L. R. 1111
2 Am. St. Rep. 860 (Lapse of 30 years).
Proceedings dismissed on grounds of lapses
of 5, 7 and 8 years after the misconduct occurred.
Thornton's Attorneys at Law, p. 1299
State vs. Clopton, 15 Missouri App. 589
People vs. Allison, 68 Ill. 151
People vs. Tanquary, 48 Colo. 122;
109 Pac. 260.

"There is another view that may be taken of
this charge. Nearly 7 years have elapsed since the
alleged misconduct. No explanation is given for
the delay, and the law will not favor the institution of prosecutions of this character after the
lapse of such a great length of time. The charge
is a serious one, and if the respondent should be
found guilty the consequences would be most disastrous. The party whose rights are injuriously
affected by the conduct of the character alleged,
ought to be required to exhibit his information
within a reasonable time, that the attorney impli-
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cated might be afforded an opportunity to make
his defense while testimony for that purpose could
be had.''
People vs. Allison, 68 Ill. 151 at 153.
THERE IS NOT A SCINTILLA OF COMPETENT
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SHOW THAT
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH SOLICITED EMPLOYMENT THROUGH ONE SID SPENCER.
Plaintiff appreciates that under Rule IV of the Revised Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, approved by the Supreme Court March 1, 1937, that" Hearings shall be conducted in such a manner as shall best
arrive at the truth'' but certainly no one will contend
that such a rule will permit a finding of misconduct based upon hearsay testimony. The courts have unanimously held that the rules and principles of evidence applicable to civil proceedings are applicable to disbarment
proceedings, and to be admissible the evidence must be
relevant, competent and material.
"The rules and principles of the law of evidence applicable to civil proceedings are also applicable to disbarment proceedings, and the evidence on either side must be such as is legally
competent to maintain the issue."
7 C. J. S. 781, cases cited Note 76-7
See cases cited under Note 83 of 6 C. J. 607
Thornton's Attorneys at Law, p. 1306.
"We cannot approve of the course followed
in the proceeding of admitting evidence without
the application of those established rules governing such matters, and with which courts and lawyers are, of course, familiar. While the Board of
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Governors (California State Bar Association)
has not been invested with judicial power, the investigation it is authorized by the State Bar Act
to make in disciplinary matters is ancillary to
and is a most important adjunct of the judicial
review by this court of the decisions of the board.
. . . vV e are of the view, therefore, that only legal
evidence, as that term is understood among lawyers, should receive the consideration of the
Board of Governors and committees of the State
Bar in the exercise of the disciplinary features of
the Bar Act... Hearsay and otherwise irrelevant
and incompetent testimony should be eliminated."
In Re Richardson, 209 Cal. 492, at 498;
288 Pac. 669.
"So, too, must a judgment fall for other errors of law apparent on the face of the record,
such as showing the judgment or the methods by
which it was obtained to b.e at variance with the
forms and practice of the court, or contrary to
well recognized principles and fundamentals of
the law. A fact apparent from the mandatory
record showing that fundamental laW' was disregarded in the establishment of the judgment will
render it null and void for all purposes."
In Re Evans, 130 Pac. 217 at 225
42 Utah 282 ( 2d case)
"Testimony as to what third person had told
witness with reference to respondents in disbarment proceedings, held inadmissible as hearsay."
In Re Sizer, 267 S. W. 922.
The testimony offered by the prosecution in the
Wunderli (d), ~Woodland (e) and York (f), cases pertaining to the solicitation and employment of R. Verne
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McCullough through the alleged activities of Sid Spencer, was incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant and hearsay
and in nowise connected the plaintiff herein with any
alleged misconduct.
It is contended that Sid Spencer was the agent of
the plaintiff in soliciting employment for three reasons:
A. THAT THE DIRECT EVIDE~NCE ESTABLISHES THE RELATION OE-. PRINCIPAL AND
AGENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFE-. AND SPENCER.

B. THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF PLAINTIFF AND SPENCER IN REGARD TO CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HIS EMPLOYMENT
AND OFFICE CONNECTIONS, JUSTIFIES A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF RATIFIED OR ACQUIESCED IN -WHATEVER SPENCER DID IN SOLICITING EMPLOYMENT FOR PLANTIFF, AND FOR
THAT REASON PLAINTIFF IS CHARGED WITH
COMPLICITY THEREIN AS A PRINCIPAL.
C. THAT A CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND SPENCER TO COMMIT
THE UNLA-WFUL ACT OF SOLICITING EMPLOYMENT AND FOR THAT REASON ADMISSIONS
AND DECLARATIONS OF SPENCER ARE BINDING UPON PLAINTIFF.
NOW AS TO "A" ON DIRECT AGENCY:
There is not a line of testimony in the record to
the effect that plaintiff said to anyone that the law firm
of McCullough and Callister, or R. Verne McCullough,

I,,
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as semor member of that firm, employed Sid Spencer
to solicit business for them. There was no evidence offered to the effect that plaintiff knew of any such contract having been offered or received from any person.
The evidence shows that Mr. and Mrs. \Vunderli
and Mr. and Mrs. Woodland never talked to Mr. McCullough about employment on their cases at any time. Clarence York testified that Sid Spencer contacted him about
employing the law firm of McCullough and Callister to
prosecute his accident claim and that he, together with
Shirley Erickson, Oren Swenson and Louise Christensen
all signed the same contract for that purpose. This testimony was thoroughly impeached by Soren C. Christensen, Shirley Erickson, Louise Christensen Erickson and
plaintiff. The significant thing in York's testimony was
brought out in his direct .examination that he did
not remember the name of plaintiff or McCullough
and Callister being in the contract, and that he did
not discuss with the plaintiff at any time this alleged contract of employment which he purportedly gave to Sid Spencer. (Tr. 167-8 and 170.)

The witness testified (Tr. 169-80) that the only
thing he discussed with Mr. McCullough was how the
a.ccident happened.
''It is well established that parties a.re not
chargeable with the declarations of their agents,
unless such declarations or statements ar.e made
durin.g the transaction of business by the agent
for the principal, and in relation to such business
and within the scope of the agency; in other
words, unless they may be deemed a part of the
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res gestae or stand as declarations of the principal himself under recognized rules of the substantive law of the agency."
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. II,
Sec. 944, p. 1741-2.
u As shown in the preceding section, before
declarations or admissions of a servant or agent
are admisS'ible against his master or principal, it
must first appear that the act or statement in
question was expr.essly or impliedly authorized.
The first essential in this regard is proof of the
fact of agency. And the act or statement may not
be used to establish such fact. Agency must be
proved aliunde. This rule is of long standing and
universal recognition . .. And, as in the case of
admissions of a partner or co-conspirator, the
necessary foundation of proof of the existence of
the relation of principal and agent between the
admitting party and the party sought to be charged cannot be laid by mere proof of the admissions of the agent as to the fact of his agency.
Admissions of authority, made by the agent himself, are plainly not within the scope of his authority as agent, and the introduction thereof in
evidence would serv.e no useful purpose and only
result in begging the issue. In fact, the declarations of the alleged agent are not competent to
prove such agency although they are accompani.ed
by acts purporting to be acts of agency."

Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. II,
Sec. 945, pages 1745-8.
The Disciplinary Committee which heard and received the evidence in the case (page 2 of Findings of
Fact) found:
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"THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSED NO PERSONAL CONTACT BY DEFENDANT WITH
ANY OF THE PERSONS SOLICITED NOR
ANY DIRECT KNUWLEDGE ON HIS PART
THAT SUCH SOLICITATION HAD BEEN
MADE BY SPENCER IN ANY CASE.''
NOW AS TO "B," IMPLIED AGENCY OR
AGENCY BY RATIFICATION:
Plaintiff testified that during a period of approximately six years Sid Spencer occupied, as a sub-tenant,
an adjoining office to the suite of McCullough and Callister in the Judge Building. (The arrangement shown
by "Exhibit E ") That during said period Mr. Spencer
paid one-third of the rent, one-third of the telephone bill
and one-third of the stenographer's salary; that Mr.
Spencer was listed under one of the same telephone numbers as McCullough and Callister.
Prior to this office arrangement, Mr. Spencer had
independent offices in the Deseret National Bank building. The evidence does not show that Mr. Spencer's
name was on the door of the office of McCullough and
Callister known as 734 Judge Building. The evidence
shows that Mr. Spencer was an investigator and had
been employed by other lawyers during the time he occupied his office in the Judge building; that during said
period Mr. Spencer was employed at various times by
the firm of McCullough and Callister in the investigation of evidentiary matters in damage suits, occasionally
did stenographic work for them and was paid monies
from time to time by said firm (a record of checks produced by plaintiff covering payments to Spencer ap-
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peared in the transcript). Plaintiff testified that they
did not pay Spencer for his work upon a per diem or
other salary basis, but that he was paid for what his services were reasonably worth in each case. Plaintiff denied that Mr. Spencer was ever employed by him or McCullough and Callister to solicit employment for them.

I

The evidence shows that Mr. McCullough discontinued the services of Mr. Spencer and terminated all
office connections with him many months before the institution of these proceedings, upon the suggestion of
Mr. Allan S. Tingey, the former President of the Utah
State Bar Association, who thought the fact that Spencer
was occupying an adjoining offce and had been employed
as an investigator by plaintiff, seemed to lend color to
rumors that Spencer was chasing cases.

It was upon the foregoing facts, more particularly
set out in the factual testimony in this Brief that the
Disciplinary Committee made the following finding:
"The disciplinary committee feels that the
circumstances indicate that the defendant must
have known that Spencer did engage in the solicitation of business for him, and whether he expressly authorized such conduct or not, must be
held to have acquiesced in whatever Spencer did
in that connection, and for that reason is charged
with complicity therein as a principal."
It is a ridiculous contention that an ethical attorney
cannot employ an investigator to investigate evidentiary
matters in damage suits. If such is the case a substantial group of these insurance and railroad lawyers had
better divorce their connections with adjusters and claim
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agents who have been substantially responsible for the
charges filed against plaintiff.
In re Sizer, 306 Mo. 356, 267 S. W. 922, the court
said:
''Sizer and Gardner (lawyers) had as much
right to employ investigators, not licensed to practice law, as the railroad or other corporations,
through the legal department or otherwise, have
to employ unlicensed persons as claim agents to
look up evidence amd make adjustments of claims,
if they could. Both would be within the law."

It seems improbable that any fair minded person
will say that an ethical lawyer may employ a person to
investigate evidentiary matters, but if the lawyer rents
a room to, such an investigator or permits his name to
be listed on one of his telephones or pays him on the
quantum meruit instead of on a per diem or salary basis,
or if he hires him to do occasional stenographic or filing
work, then such a lawyer becomes a principal with such
a person in any unethical or unlawful act done without
the knowledge of the principal and outside the scope of
the agency of such investigator and without acceptation
by the principal of the fruits of such alleged unethical
activity.
~r. L. 0. Thomas testified there were approximately
154 cases filed by plaintiff in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County during the six years Mr.
Spencer had office connections with plaintiff. Where in
the record do we find evidence of acceptation by plaintiff
of the fruits of any alleged unethical activities of Mr.
Spencer? Your Honorable Court will have to ignore the

'I'
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impeaching testimony of Soren C. Christensen, Louise
Christensen Erickson, his daughter, Shirley Erickson,
Oren M. Swenson (on cross-examination) and the plaintiff, and accept the testimony alone of Mr. Clarence York
that he employed plaintiff upon the solicitation of Sid
Spencer but without the knowledge of such solicitation
by plaintiff, to make a finding that plaintiff was recipient of the fruits of any alleged unethical activities of
Mr. Spencer over that entire six year period. The York
case was a trivial matter involving a settlement of $150,
with a $50 fee. It was merely incidental to the case of
Louise Christensen which came into plaintiff's office as
ethically as any case was ever given to a lawyer.
WOULD THE CONTRACT PURPORTED TO HAVE
BEEN SIGNED BY YORK BE ENFORCEABLE
AGAINST McCULLOUGH UNDER THE THEORY THAT SPENCER WAS HIS AGENT?
These would be the vital queries propounded by any
compet.ent court :
QUESTION: Where is the contract?
ANSWER BY PLAINTIFF: We have never
seen any such a contract and, therefore, cannot
produce it.
ANSWER BY MR. YORK: "I did not keep
167
a copy of it."
QUESTION: "Was the name of McCullough
and Callister mentioned in the contract?"
168
ANS~WER BY MR. YORK: "It has been a
long time ago (1931); so I don't remember that."
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QUESTION: "Do you recall any of the terms
and conditions of the contract?''
ANSWER BY YORK: "Yes, that if they
settled out of court they was to do it for one-third,
and if they went to court they was to take fifty
per cent of whatever the claim was they got from
the railroad company.''
QUESTION: Who signed the contract?
ANSWER BY MR. YORK: "We all put our
names on the same piece of paper at Shirley Erickson's home at Orem, Utah, namely, Clarence York,
Shirley Erickson, Oren Swenson," and "It seems,
as I recollect, that her name (Louise Erickson)
was on this same contract, whatever it was we
signed."
QUESTION: "Oh, you think she signed the
same contract, too~"
ANSWER : "Yes."
169
180

254

FURTHER ANS\VER BY YORK: I never
discussed this contract I signed for Spencer with
McCullough at any time.
I only signed one paper for Spencer and I
did not sign anything for McCullough. I admit
I signed Exhibit 4 which is not a contract but a
statement of how the accident happened.
ANSWER BY SHIRLEY ERICKSON:
There was no such contract signed by me or any
of the others in my presence.
"Q. Did Mr. Spencer, at any time during that
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conversation ever ask you, or anybody, any of the
others to sign a contract to employ me?
"A. No. sir.
"Q. Did you sign a contract at that time, that
Mr. Spencer handed you, to employ me?
"A. No sir.
"Q. Did you see any of the others s~gn any
contract?
"A. I did not.
"Q. Did Mr. Spencer, in your presence, and
~n the presence of those people, while you were
there, mention anything about a contract to employ me?
"A. No sir." ...
"Q. I will ask you, Mr. Erickson, if Mr. Spencer at any time, ever asked you, or marie any intimation whatsoever about your coming to me, and
employing me as your attorney?
"A. No sir.
'' Q. Let me call your attention again to the
time that the two other boys and yourself were
down at your house, two or three days after the
accident. I think you said somewhere around the
latter part of the week of the 11th-did you see
any contracts exhibited to any of those boys, or
did you see them sign a contract at that time?
''A. No. There was none signed.
'' Q. Was there anything signed except the
longhand notes which Mr. Spencer took from you
ther.e?
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''A. That was all.''
LOUISE ERICKSON testified as follows:
"Q. Did Mr. Spencer at any time in your entire experience in this particular case, ever ask
you, or talk to you about employing me f
279
''A. No.
"Q. Did he make any mention about employment, as far as I was concerned 1
280
''A. No, he did not; he never mentioned that."
283-4
My father came to the hospital with a contract to employ Mr. McCullough and I signed it
278
at the hospital. I have a copy of it at home.
224-5
ANSWER BY SOREN C. CHRISTENSEN:
Mr. McCullough was recommended to me by Mrs.
Michael, my daughter's landlady, a Mr. Draper,
who formerly lived in Moroni and was then living
in Salt Lake City, and a Mrs. Calder. On Tuesday, October 13, 1931, my daughter and I signed
the contract with Mr. McCullough. We were the
only persons who signed this contract. On Wednesday, October 14, 1931, (two days before Mr.
Spencer interviewed the boys at Or em) Clarence
Y ark, Oren Swenson and Shirley Erickson came
down to the place I was staying and I told them
that I had engaged Mr. McCullough as our attorney to take care of my daughter's case and the
226 boys told me they intended to support the girl
(Louise Erickson) by all means and inasmuch as
we had engaged Mr. McCullough they felt they
would engaged him for their part of the affair too.
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Clarence Y ark said at that time that inasmuch as
we had engaged McCullough as our attorney that
he felt like it was better that the rest of them engage McCullmtgh to handle the case altogether.
ANS-WER BY OREN M. s-WENSON: My
brother is working for Clarence York in the barber shop at Orem. York and I were very close
pals. I am positive the only paper I ever signed
when Mr. Spencer was present was the one signed
by Shirley Erickson and myself down in Orem.
That is the only time Mr. Spencer ever contacted
me wit? reference to signing a paper. I am sure
that is correct as it is clear in my mind notwithstanding it was some eight years ago. CWitness
shown "Exhibit 7" containing his signature and
that of Shirley Erickson, and "Exhibit 4" containing signature of Clarence York. (Neither document was a contract of employment but a statement of how the accident occurreJ.)
"Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Swenson, isn't
it a fact, without quibbling about the situation,
that these are the three signatures to the two pieces
of paper that were signed down in Orem when Mr.
Spencer came down there?
"Q. Isn't that true, Mr. Swenson?
"A. Yes sir." Mr. Clarence York, Shirley
Erickson and myself talked with Mr. Soren C.
Christensen either Tuesday or \V ednesday following the Sunday the accident occurred and before we had seen Mr. Spencer. At that time Mr.
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Christensen told us that he had been up to Mr.
McCullough's office and had employed Mr. McCullough to represent his daughter, Louise.
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ANSWER BY MR. McCULLOUGH: I did not
have any written contract of employment with
Clarence York, Shirley Erickson or Oren Swenson. They told me in my office that I had better
take care of all their cases. I told them I would
represent them on the same basis as I was representing Miss Christensen (Mrs. Erickson). The
boys' injuries were trivial. Mr. York's doctor
submitted a bill of $2.00. I went over the typewritten statement ,Exhibit 4) with Mr. York
which he had signed. He offered no objections to
the statement. Mr. York was very happy about
the entire situation until he found out that Louise
Christensen was not going to give him a cut of
her $4500 vvhich she got.

CERTAINLY NO ONE ~WOULD CONTEND THAT
ANY COMPETENT COURT WOULD HOLD THAT
SUCH A CONTRACT COULD BE ENFORCED
AGAINST McCULLOUGH.
"The authorities are unanirnmls in holding
that there can be no ratification by acquiescence,
silence, or faihtre to rep'ttdiate, 1mless the principal has full and complete kno'wledge of oll the
material facts attending the 1mauthorized transaction.''
Vol. II.
American Jurisprudence, pp. 236 p. 190.
See cases cited.
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There is not a word of testimony that McCullough
knew of the existence of any of these purported contracts and the record is silent as to any knowledge on
his part of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
soliciting by Spencer of any such alleged contracts. It
is ridiculous to claim that because Clarence York said
he signed such a contract, therefore McCullough had
knowledge that Spencer had solicited the contract for
the reason Spencer was employed at various times during
a period of six years as an investigator for McCullough.
In the case of In Re Seidman, 240 N. Y. S. 592, the
court held: "that the fact six cases had been obtained for
attorney by solicitation over a period of five years did
not make him chargeable, as matter of law, with notice
of soliciting on part of his .employees, in disciplinary
proceedings.''

"In order that a particular act or failure to
act upon the part of the principal may be effective to ratify the una'Ldhorized act of another,
certain conditions and factors entering into and
surrounding the act of ratification are essential.
To be effective, the principal must intend to ratify the unauthorized act, he must have the power
of ratifying the act done, he m1Jst ratify the transaction in its entirety, he must have knowledge of
all the material facts surrmmding the transaction
to be ratified, the person acting in an unauthorized manner must purport to be acting in, the matt.er on behalf of the principal, and the act itself
must be capable of authorization."
American Jurisprudence, Vol. II, p. 175,
Sec. 220.
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AS TO "C", ON THEORY OF CONSPIRACY,
THE ADMISSIONS OF A CONSPIRATOR ARE
BINDING UPON A CO-CONSPIRATOR.
u It is a well settled principle of law that a
conspiracy cannot be proved by admissions of one
party thereto.''
Crites vs. St. Paul Ins. Co. (N. D.)
200 N. W. 1016.
"The underlying principle of the rule has
been well expressed as follows: 'When an unlawful conspiracy or combination is established, everything said, written or done by either of the
conspirators in the execution or furtherance of
the common purpose is deemed to have been said,
done, or written by every one of them, and may
be proved against each and all of them.' But in
such cases it must first be proved, by other evidence, that a conspiracy existed at the time the
declarations were made. Moreover, the mere declarations of one of the alleged conspirators are
not competent for this purpose, unless they form
a part of the res gestae. Even if a conspiracy is
shown aliunde, the declarations of one conspirator are not admissible against the others, if made
after the common design is accomplished or abandoned.''
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. II,
Sec. 943, p. 1740.
" •Before statements of one alleged conspirator are admissible in evidence against his alleged
co-conspirator, the party offering the same must
fit·st make md a prima facie case of conspiracy
aliunde and, ~uhen such a prima facie case is made
out, then the statements of one conspirator made
during the pendency of the wrongful enterprise,
before its consummation, and in furtherance of
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its object, will be received in evidence against his
co-conspirator.' Campbell vs. Newton, 52 Okl. 517;
152 P. 841 (syllabus by the court.)"
Footnote to foregoing citation (p. 1740,
Vol. II Jones Comm. on Ev.)
IN THE CASE AT BAR THERE IS NOT A
SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE OF ANY CONSPIRACY
EXCEPT THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF THIRD
PARTIES WHO TESTIFIED TO ALLEGED CONVERSATIONS WITH SPENCER \VHICH ARE
NEVER ADMISSIBLE UNTIL THE CONSPIRACY
IS SHOWN ALIUNDE.
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Plaintiff does not admit that any of these
alleged conversations were held with Mr. Sid
Spencer. We do not wish to impune the good
motives of Mr. and Mrs. \Vunderli or Mr. and
Mrs. Woodland. That some person talked to these
people we will admit but whether that person was
Sid Spencer is very questionable. Mr. Fritz Wunderli described this mysterious Spencer as a
neighbor of his in Highland Park. (Mr. Spencer
never lived in Highland Park in his life.) That
he did not remember his name until he was shown
affidavit he signed for the Union Pacific claim
agent. That he could not tell whether Spencer was
dark or light complexioned. That he could not
describe him when he talked with Mr. McCullough
at the Beau Brummel Cafe before the hearing and
he could not describe Spencer at the hearing ex-
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cept he was taller and younger than he (Mr. Wunderli.) That this man did not offer him a contract
to ~ign at any time. ThaL the man only came once
(Jan. 12, 1934) and he has never seen him since.
(Spencer has lived and worked here ever since.)
MR. vV. T. ~WOODLAND testified that this
man came to his home October 24, 1933, said his
name was Spencer, did not remember his first
name. First thought he was an insurance agent.
He never saw the man after that morning. The
only thing he remembered about him was that he
was tall and dark complexioned. (Spencer is extremely light complexioned.)
MRS. LYDIA vVOODLAND : This man had
a paper and on the bottom of the paper was "S' ~
''Spencer.'' He was fair faced, light complexioned
and about as tall as Mr. Thomas. (Thomas is
about 5 feet 8 inches; Sid Spencer is 6 feet 2 inches.) I cannot recall the name of McCullough and
Callister or McCullough being on the paper at all.
About an hour after the man had gone, an attorney came and left me his card sho~wing he was
officing in the Kearns building. The person's
name on the card was not McCullough or Callister. This attorney was not McCullough. (McCullough did not office in the Kearns building.)
We certainly have a marked variety of descriptions of this man Spencer. It may be that the
insurance adjusters and railroad claim agents who
obtained affidavits in each of these cases can dis-
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close more about the identity of the man claiming
to be Spencer.
The Court's attention is called to the charges
set out in (b) of Paragraph III of the complaint,
wherein R. Verne McCullough was charged with
personally soliciting employment from one J. A.
Nelson. Mr. L. 0. Thomas, at the instance of another lawyer, secured an affidavit from Nelson
that McCullough had personally solicited employment from him. After an investigation which determined that J. A. Nelson did not even know
McCullough, MR. THOMAS TOLD THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE THAT "I vVAS
CONVINCED IN MY UWN MIND THAT IT
\VAS NOT MR. McCULLOUGH THAT SOLICITED THE CASE." McCullough insisted that
the charge be not dismissed until Nelson testified
before the Committee and explained how such an
affidavit was obtained; that such testimony would
probably throw a lot of light on how the rest of
these affidavits were secured. McCullough demanded that Nelson be brought before the Committee so that full disclosure be made as to why
that affidavit was signed and who suggested that
Verne McCullough's name be put into the affidavit. This request was refused. Mr. Thomas said
he received word from two or three sources to
the effect that Mr. McCullough had been to the
Nelson home and solicited business. Plaintiff demanded the source of his information but he re-
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fused to give it on the ground it was confidential.
The Court's attention is further directed to
the dismissal of charges of solicitation in subdivision (c) in which R. Verne McCullough was
charged with soliciting employment from one Mrs.
Madge Masters through his agent, Sid Spencer.
Mrs. Madge Masters was subpoenaed as a witness.
She appeared before the Disciplinary Conm1ittee
and -vvas sworn as a witness for the prosecution.
The prosecution dropped the charge on the pretext that the witness became sick after the hearing began.
The Court's attention is particularly directed
to the testimony of Mrs. Selma Richey, a witness
called by the prosecution, to support another of
these fake charges filed against McCullough (subdivision (i) Paragraph III of complaint-attempt
subornation.)
"Q. How many times did Mr. Thomas come
up to your apartment and ask you to sign affidavits which you read and which were not true?

"A. Oh,' MR. YOUNG: Well, that assumes a fact,
doesn't it?
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, she can state
if he didn't come up. I will lay the foundation.
"Q. Did Mr. Thomas come up to your apartment at any time with affidavits which were not
true, and ask you to sign them?
"A. Yes sir.
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'' Q. How many times did he come up with
those false affidavits and ask you to sign them?
"A. I believe three times, if I am not mistaken.''
(It seems the charges were sustained against
Thomas instead of McCullough.)

AS TO DIVISION II, SUED. (g) SOLICITING
EMPLOYMENT FROM KATHERINE SUTFIN:
THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE WHO
HEARD THE WITNESSES TESTIFY AND
RECEIVED ALL THE EVIDENCE OFFERED
BY THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE HELD THAT THE EVIDENCE DID
NOT SUSTAIN THE CHARGE. (Findings (g),
p. 2). The Board of Commissioners of the Utah
State Bar, for reasons unknown to plaintiff, reversed the Findings of the Disciplinary Committee
on this charge without any additional evi:lence
having been offered or received by them.
44
Five witnesses were called, namely, Homer
57
E. Grove, Gerald Blake, Ellis J. Pickett, Ben
74
Lingenfelter and R. Verne McCullough. The tes435
timony of all these witnesses is carefully abstract799
ted in this Brief. (Br. p. 46-60.)

440

The undisputed facts in evidence show :
1. That on the 7th day of October, 1935, at
the request of Mrs. Katherine Sutfin, Ben Lingenfelter telephoned plaintiff from St. George
stating that he had been requested by Mrs. Hail
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and Mrs. Sutfin to call McCullough and have him
come down about an accident in which Mr. Sutfin
had been killed.
2. That Mrs. Sutfin waited in St. George for
McCullough until after midnight of October 7th
before leaving with Gerald Blake, her two children and Mr. Sutfin's body for Phoenix, Arizona,
via Las Vegas, Nevada.
3. That McCullough went down to St. George
arriving there about an hour and a half or two
hours after Mrs. Sutfin left for Las Vegas; that
he first talked to Mrs. Hail at the Liberty Hotel,
who told him that Mrs. Sutfin had requested that
she telephone McCullough and that Mrs. Sutfin
had waited practically all night and had concluded McCullough was not coming when she left for
Phoenix.
4. Mrs. Hail advised McCullough that Mr.
Lingenfelter was at the checking station at Santa
Clara. McCullough went to the checking station
to talk with Mr. Lingenfelter who stated that Mrs.
Sutfin had waited for McCullough until after midnight but she had gone on about an hour and a
half before; McCullough told Mr. Lingenfelter
that he was sorry but he could not get there sooner.
5. Mr. Lingenfelter then suggested that he
would call the Sheriff at Las Vegas to have him
intercept Mrs. Sutfin and tell her McCullough was
on the road to Las Vegas.
6. Mr. Lingenfelter put in a call to the sheriff
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of Las Vegas and told him that the attorney Mrs.
Sutfin had requested to come down from Salt Lake
was on the road over there and asked the sheriff
if he would give that information to Mrs. Sutfin
who was traveling in a truck with her two l:ttle
children, a young man and her husband's corpse.
Lingenfelter told the sheriff McCullough would
meeet her at the police station. McCullough was
reluctant to go to Las Vegas as he had been traveling all night.

7. At Las Vegas Mrs. Sutfin told McCullough she had not employed Ellis J. Pickett or
any other lawyer and she told him she would not
employ any lawyer until after she talked to her
63-73 people at Phoenix (see particularly testimony of
Gerald Blake abstracted herein).
79-80
Pickett testified Mrs. Sutfin employed him
but Mrs. Sutfin denied it in a letter to Mrs. Hail
cited by Pickett in his letter ("Exhibit 1 ") to
Mrs. Sutfin's attorneys at Phoenix.
63
8. Mrs. Sutfin approved of Mr. McCullough
making an investigation of fact at St. George on
803
his way back to Salt Lake and requested him to
correspond with her at Phoenix in care of Mr.
Max McLeary, Southern Pac. Railroad Co. McCullough made the investigation and on returning
808
to Salt Lake sent Mrs. Sutfin a letter ("Exhibit
18") explaining what he had done. (We recommend these letters be read.) On October 16th,
1935, McCullough received a letter ("Exhibit 19")

109
from Mrs. Sutfin's attorneys, Lewkowitz and Zaversack, stating they had been employed by Mrs.
Sutfin and thanking McCullough on behalf of Mrs.
Sutfin for the many kindnesses he had shown her.
813
808
9. On Nov. 30, 1935, McCullough received a
telegram ("Ex. 17") from Mrs. Sutfin stating she
had discharged her Arizona attorneys and asked
McCullough to come to St. George. McCullough
sent a letter ("Exhibit 20") to Mrs. Sutfin requesting her to come to Salt Lake. On Dec. 9,
1935, Mrs. Sutfin signed a contract ("Exhibit
22 ") employing McCullough to represent her.
Mrs. Sutfin gave McCullough Lewkowitz and Zaversack's file and a letter of withdrawal from them.
How any fair minded board could make any
other finding than was done by the Disciplinary
Committee is beyond credence. The fact that Mr.
Grove may have misunderstood instructions from
his superior officer or the fact that the sheriff
himself was not clear as to what Mr. Lingenfelter
requested, cannot in any conceivable manner be
charged against plaintiff. McCullough acted in
good faith in every step of this entire case and
there is not a word of evidence to impune his good
motives and ethical conduct.
NOW AS TO DIVISION III, SUBD. (1) AND (m):
These charges are set out in full on page 64
and 65 herein.
Both of these charges are centered in the testimony given by McCullough in the contempt pro-
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ceedings filed against him in the City Court of
Salt Lake City, before Honorable B. P. Leverich,
Judge, in the matter entitled, The State of Utah
Ex Rel B. P. Leverich versus R. Verne McCullough (Transcript thereof Ex. 12). We particularly request the court to re-read McCullough's
testimony abstracted on page 65 of this brief.
The gravamen of the charge in Subd. (1) is
as follows:
"That thereafter, although the said R.
Verne McCullough well knew the whereabouts
of the said Harry E. Erickson in the State of
California, the said R. Verne McCullough refused and failed to divulge to the court or to
the sheriff's office or to the office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney the whereabouts of the
said Harry E. Erickson."
In the contempt proceedings McCullough was
charged with failure to obey two orders of the
court. The one made on the 24th day of February,
1937, to have Harry E. Erickson in court on the 4th
day of March, 1937, and the other, to have the defendant present in court on the 6th day of March,
1937, and that McCullough wilfully disobeyed and
resisted said orders in that he wilfully counseled
and advised the said Harry E. Erickson to remove
himself from the jurisdiction of the court. (See
the Findings and Judgment of contempt on file
herein.)
IF McCULLOUGH WAS GUILTY OF CONTEMPT, TH5 OFFENSE WAS COMPLETE
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ON MARCH 6th, 1937, WHEN HARRY E.
ERICKSON DID NOT APPEAR IN JUDGE
LEVERICH'S COURT ON THAT DATE. (Concurred in by Mr. Dobbs.) THERE WAS NO ISSUE IN THOSE PROCEEDINGS ON ANY MATTER SUBSEQUENT TO THAT TIME. McCULLOUGH WAS NOT CHARGED IN THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS, AS CHARGED
HEREIN, WITH FAILURE AND REFUSAL
TO DIVULGE TO THE COURT OR TO THE
SHERIFF'S OFFICE OR TO THE OFFICE
OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
THE WHEREABOUTS OF HARRY E. ERICKSON AFTER HE LEFT THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURT ON MARCH 6, 1937.
McCullough was charged in paragraph III,
Subd. (k) of the complaint herein that on the 5th
day of March, 1937, "he advised and counseled
Harry E. Erickson to immediately leave the state
of Utah, although the said R. Verne McCullough
well knew at said time that the said criminal action was pending before the aforesaid court."
The Disciplinary Committee and the Board
of Commissioners in their findings held that the
evidence did not sustain this charge.

"K"
"The Disciplinary Committee finds that the
charges made herein of advising and consulting
the said Harry E. Erickson to leave the state of
Utah are not sustained herein.''
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The Board of Commissioners m paragraph
three, page 2, of their findings held:
"The Commissioners find from the evidence
presented that the charges specifically set forth
in paragraph 3, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (h), (i),
(j) and (k) are not sustained, and for that reason
the Commissioners recommend that each of said
charges be dismissed."
The only issue left to consider in the contempt
proceedings is the alleged disobedience of McCullough to the two orders of Judge Leverich in
not having Erickson present in court March 4th
and March 6th, 1937. How can McCullough be in
wilful disobedience to these orders of Judge Leverich when the abovementioned findings exonerates him from ''wilfully counseling and advising
Erickson to remove himself from the jurisdiction
fo the court 1'' Surely no thinking person would
say that because a defendant in a criminal action
jumps his recognizance without aid or complicity
from his lawyer, and removes himself from the
jurisdiction of the court, that such lawyer is guilty
of contempt in failing to have defendant present
in court because the lawyer was instrumental in
getting the defendant released without bail. vVho
ever heard of a bondsman being found guilty of
contempt because a defendant jumped his bond
without the knowledge of the bondsman 1
Is it fair or just to charge McCullough in
these proceedings with alleged misconduct in fail-

I
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ing to divulge to Judge Leverich the wher.eabouts
of Erickson after he left the jurisdiction of the
court on March 6, 1937, and then determine the
truth or falsity of that charge from McCullough's
testimony given in a contempt proceedings where
no such issue was ever raised or even contemplated?

EVEN WITHOUT SUCH AN ISSUE, A
PROPER ANALYSIS OF McCULLOUGH'S
TESTIMONY IN THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS CLEARLY SHOWS THAT HE GAVE
TO THE COURT IN ANSWER TO THE IMMATERIAL QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED TO
HIM AT THE CONTEMPT HEARING ON
APRIL 13, 1937, ALL THE INFORMATION
HE HAD AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF
HARRY E. ERICKSON.
McCullough's testimony is replete with statement after statement that Erickson was in California with relatives. See abstract of his testimony on page 65 of this brief.
The Disciplinary Committee in their findings
(p. 5) found that the evidence did not show McCullough knew the address and telephone number
of Erickson at Riverside on April13, 1937. There
is not a word of information given McCullough
in the station to station phone calls from Erickson
on March 9th and 25th concerning the where-
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abouts of Erickson which had not been given to
the court through the answers of numerous questions asked McCullough by Judge Leverich and
counsel.
vVe contend these telephone messages from
Erickson were confidential and privileged communications. The reiterations of these conversations by McCullough would have disclosed the
confidential secrets of Erickson of why he left
the jurisdiction of the court, his reluctance to return, his incorrect assumption that Standings controlled the prosecution and the right of extradition, the fact that he was going under an assumed
name, the element of flight and other matters, the
disclosure of which would have jeopardized the
substantial rights of the defendant when tried.
Subdivision 5 of Rule II of the Revised Rules
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar,
reads:
"It is the duty of an attorney and counselor: To maintain inviolate the confidence,
and, at every peril to himself, to pr.eserve the
secrets of his client."
''Statements regarding the commission of a
crime already committed, made by the party
committing it to an attorney at law when consulting him in that capacity, are privileged
communications; and this is true even though
the purpose of the interview was to devise
means to escape the consequences of the
crime.''
Thornton on Attorneys at Law, page 214;
Alexander vs. U. S., 138 U. S. 353.
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Opinion No. 23, May 1930, American Bar Association Journal :
"Confidences of a Client; Duty of em Attorney to Protect the Confidence of a Client.
"A member of the Association asks the Committee to express its opinion regarding the duty
of an attorney to disclose to the prosecuting authorities, the whereabouts of a fugitive client. The
facts as stated are that prior to the trial, the client fled and went into hiding, his bond was forfeited and the court issued a warrant for his arrest, his relatives requested the attorney to endeaver to find him and gave the attorney confidential information as to places where he might
be found, and the attorney eventually located him
and advised him to return and surrender, which
he eventually did. The question presented is
whether it was the duty of the attorney, under the
circumstances, to inform the officials as to his
client's hiding place, or whether such information
is one of those confidences of a client which the
profession is ethically bound to respect.
"The Committee's opinion was stated by Mr.
Gallert.
"It is in the public interest that even the
worst criminal should have counsel, and counsel
cannot properly perform their duties without
knowing the truth. To hold that an attorney
should reveal confidential information which he
has obtained, by virtue of his professional employment from members of the family of a criminal,
would prevent such frank disclosure as might be
necessary to a proper protection of the client's
interest.''
It is contended McCullough should have claimed the
privilege of not disclosing these telephone communica-
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tions. How can you claim a privilege from stating a conversation when you are never asked about the conversation~ McCullough was questioned as to the whereabouts
of Erickson. We submit his answers detailed every bit
of information he had. If McCullough had told the court
of these confidential telephone communications, such
fact would not have added anything to the information
already given to the court.
"The right to privilege from disclosure to
which communications between attorney and client are entitled, belongs to the client, and not to
the attorney, and therefore, the client may renounce or waive it at his pleasure."
Thornton on Attorneys at Law, p. 221.
The quoted testimony of McCullough in the Findings
of the Disciplinary Committee and the Board of Commissioners, is badly garbled. Answers are isolated from
one part of the contempt transcript and so placed as to
appear in answer to questions taken from an entirely
different part of the transcript. Both questions and answers are misquoted notwithstanding they are set off
with quotation marks indicating direct quotations from
the transcript.
The quotation, as it appears on page 11 of the Findings of the Board of Commissioners, cannot be found
any place in the contempt transcript. It was copied from
the complaint herein (p. 7). We would recommend that
the Court read the testimony of Mr. McCullough as carefully abstracted in this brief.
Subdivision (m) is a charge of perjury on matters
pertaining to the case of State of Utah versus Harry E.
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Erickson. The gravamen of this charge is that R. Verne
McCullough testified falsely in the contempt hearing before Judge Leverich on April 13, 1937, and in said testimony did state as true matter in substance as follows:
'' 'I told Erickson not to leave before he saw
Oli\'."

'' 'I didn't see Erickson agam or talk with
him again after the morning of Thursday, the 4th
of March'.''
" 'I don't know where Erickson is except
that I was informed that he had relative:'~ some
place in California, and I imagine that he is with
them'."
"That in truth and in fact the said R. V eme
McCullough did see and did talk to Harry E. Erickson on the 5th day of March, 1937, and did then
advise and counsel the said Harry E. Erickson to
immediately leave the State of Utah.
"That in truth and in fact the said R. Verne
McCullough knew the address and telephone nnmber of the said Harry E. Erickson in Riverside,
California, at the time the said R. Verne McCullough testified on the said 13th day of April,
1937."
THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
MADE
THIS FINDING (page 5) IN REFERENCE TO THAT
TESTIMONY:
'' 'I told Erickson not to leave before he snw
me.'
"THE DISCIPLINARY COMMFl'TEE
FINDS THAT THE FOREGOING STATE1fENT WAS AND IS TRUE; that at said time
and place the defendant further testified as follows:
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'' 'I did not see Erickson again or talk with
him again after the morning of Thursday the 4th
of March.'
" 'I don't know where Erickson is except that
I was informed that he had relatives some place
in California and I imagine that he is with them.'

''It is charged that R. Verne McCullough
saw and talked with Harry E. Erickson on the 5th
day of March, 1937, and then advised and counseled him to immediately leave the State of Utah;
and further that the address and telephone number of the said Harry E. Erickson at Riven;ide,
California, were known to the said McCullough at
the time he testified on April 13, 1937.
"The first of the two statements above quoted was claimed by the defendant to have been
made at the termination of a line of testimony and
in reference to a period ending on March 7th and
his connection with Erickson during that period.
The disciplinary committee finds that Mr. McCullough did not see or talk to Harry E. Erickson
on the 5th day of March, 1937, and did not on that
date advise or counsel him to leave the State of
Utah, but that on the 4th day of March, 1937, he
had told Erickson that the latter must leav.e the
State of Utah as a condition imposed in connection with the dismissal of the prosecution pending
against Erickson, and further advised him not to
leave until he, Erickson, had seen McCullough.
The disciplinary committee is not satisfied from
the evidence that McCullough knew the address
and telephone number of Erickson at Riverside on
April 13, 1937, but is satisfied from the evidence
that McCullough did know how to get in contact
with Erickson on April13, 1937, and so finds the
fact to be. ''
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In the case of State of Utah versus R. Verne McCullough, filed in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, No. 10540~ McCullough
was charged with the same identical acts of perjury as
set forth herein. After a ten day trial in which evidence
was taken covering more than five hundred pages, Judge
James W. McKinney of that court directed the jury to
return a verdict of not guilty at the close of the State's
case. Surely with that record and with all the defense
testimony from some fourteen witnesses, including plaintiff herein, offered and received at the hearing before
the Disciplinary Committee, no other verdict could be
found from the evidence.
THE FOLLOWING
TESTIMONY AS
QUOTED IN CHARGE (m) AND COPIED IN
BOTH SETS OF FINDINGS, CANNOT BE
FOUND IN THAT LANGUAGE IN THE ENTIRE CONTEMPT TRANSCRIPT:
"I didn't see Erickson again or talk with
him again after the morning of Thursday, the 4th
day of March."
"I don't know where Erickson is except that
I was informed th(Lt he lwd rel(Ltives some place
in C (Llifornia, (Lnd I imagine th(Lt he is with them."
In reference to the first quoted ( 1) statement,
we again call the court's attention to the testimony of McCullough in the disbarment proceedings:
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"Now, I want to call the Commission's attention to two or three things that I think my
testimony should contain: When I was put on direct-examination by Judge Lewis he asked me the
question: (Ex. 12, page 51)
" 'Q. Do you remember the incidents that occurred during the week beginning March the 1st
and ending March the 8th, with reference to one
Erickson who was under arrest?' And that is the
subject matter which we were discussing at the
time of the contempt proceedings. And when this
controversy arose is related here in the transcript.
When I made the answer to the question :

'Q. Did you have any direct communication
with him at any time after the morning of Thursday, March the 5th?
" 'A. No. I never talked with Mr. Erickson
after the morning of Thursday, March the 4th, at
9 o'clock, 9:20 or 9:30 in the morning,'-! had reference at that time to the detailing of the events
of the particular week prior to the time Harry
Erickson left town on Saturday morning.
"MR. DOBBS: Your position is that that
must be considered in connection with its text, and
if the text shows-and that the nature of the questions then being asked you was of the character
to lead you to believe that you were not being interrogated with respect to anything occurring
after March 6th 1
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"MR. McCULLOUGH: I wasn't even asked
anything after that.
"MR. HANSEN: At that time the offense
of contempt was complete, if he was guilty of contempt.
''MR. DOBBS: Yes.
"MR. McCULLOUGH:
(Reads.) (Ex. 12, page 63):

679

Next

question:

" 'Q. I will ask you, Mr. McCullough, whether you have ever given Mr. Erickson any instructions'"I think probably the correct word was 'directions,' 'about leaving town, other than those
you have now related to the court~
" 'A. I have never given Mr. Erickson permission, as far as I am concerned, to leave town
at any time. On the contrary, my admonitions
were not to leave town until he saw me, and that
was given to him at approximately 9:30 on March
4th.'
''There was nothing said about any subsequent communication after the day he had left
town. My attention was never called to any telephone conversation or about my having talked
with him after that." ...
'' 'Q. ~Why did you tell Mr. Erickson that he
would have to leave the state~'
" 'A. Because Mr. Wallace told me that was
a condition on his dismissing the action.'
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"'JUDGE LEWIS: If the court please, it
seems to me that the witness is entitled to a little
fairer treatment than that. He stated that on
Thursday he told Erickson, in conforming to the
requirements of the County Attorney, that he
would have to leave town as a condition of the
dismissal. Now he is asked why he told him on
Saturday morning that he would have to leave
town.'
"Judge Lewis apparently got the thing all
mixed up.-(Continues quoting):
'' 'THE COURT: I did not understand the
question that way.
" 'JUDGE LEWIS: It was at the time of the
order for the transfer to Judge Ellett.
" 'THE COURT: I did not understand his
question to be that.'
''Then originally the record read ' (Question
read.) '; but that was corrected by Mr. Otterstrom
in his testimony, and he said that the record was
read, not the question read. The record was read.

"And to satisfy the dispute between the court
and Judge Lewis as to the last time that week that
I had talked to him, I stated:

" 'A. I never had any personal conversation
with Mr. Erickson after Thursday morning at
9:30.'
''And that is where Mr. Otterstrom corrects
the record now, by the way.
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"MR. THOMAS: The only place he corrected
it is that he says there, instead of '(Question
read.) ' 'Record read.'

681

"MR. McCULLOUGH: Yes, and we had a
discussion over it, and it was because Judge Lewis
got all balled up as to which day it was, that I
told him about the County Attorney saying that
the man would have to leave, and this is a volunteer statement, to satisfy Lewis and the court just
exactly what the situation was."
This testimony refers to that given by McCullough on pages of the contempt transcript
(Exhibit 12) 51, 63 and 76.
THE SECOND QUOTED ( ~) STATEMENT
ABOVE SET FORTH:
''I don't know where Erickson is except that
I was informed that he had relatives some place
in California, and I imagine that he is with them.''
WAS NEVER SAID BY McCULLOUGH AND
THIS STATEMENT CANNOT BE FOUND
ANY PLACE IN THE ENTIRE CONTEMPT
TRANSCRIPT.

There is not a scintilla of direct testimony or
a circumstance surrounding the contempt proceedings which contradicts the intendment of McCullough that the statement; "I never had any personal conversation with Mr. Erickson after Thursday morning at 9 :30" (March 4th )-was made in
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detailing the events of the week prior to Harry
Erickson leaving town.
The Supreme Court of California said:
"AN ACCUSATION AGAINST AN ATTORNEY IN A DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS IS IN THE NATURE OF A CRIMINAL
CHARGE, AND ALL INTENDMENTS ARE
IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED, AND HE
SHOULD BE GIVEN THE BENEFIT OF
DOUBTS ARISING FROM CONFLICT OF
EVIDENCE.''
In Re Alameda County Bar Assn. (Calif.)
170 Pac. 432 at 433.
Assuming for the sake of argument that these
two telephone conversations from Erickson on
March 9th and 25th had been material to the issues in the contempt proceedings, what would McCullough have to gain in not disclosing them to
the court.
McCullough did not seduce the 13 year old
child. McCullough did not counsel or advise Erickson to absent himself from the jurisdiction of
the court (Definitely determined in F;inding
(k)); "It was to McCullough's financial interest
to have him stay and McCullough had no motive
to have Erickson absent himself at any time."
(Contempt Transcript p. 65). Every act done
and statement made by McCullough definitely indicated his desire to get Erickson back in the jurisdiction of the court. These telephone communi-
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cations were not material to the issues in the contempt proceedings but even assuming they were
and that McCullough's attention had been called
to them, there is no motive, reflected by the entire record, for McCullough not to disclose these
communications except "To maintain inviolate
the confidence, and, at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client." (Rule 5).
The only contempt of court which R. Verne McCullough could be charged with arose in connection with the
prosecution of one Harry E. Erickson, charged with the
crime of carnal knowledge of a female over the age of
13 years and under the age of 18 years, in violation of
Title 103, Chapter 51, Section 19, of the Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933. The complaint in that case was signed
by Lawrence Standing as complaining witness and B. P.
Leverich, City Judge and ex officio justice of the peace
in and for Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah. The crime charged in said complaint is a felony
and B. P. Leverich, City Judge and ex officio justice
of the peace, as aforesaid, was acting as a committing
magistrate in conducting the prosecution of said defendant. Judge Leverich could not be acting as a city judge
nor justice of the peace as neither of these offices have
any jurisdiction of felonies, except that a city judge or
a justice of the peace may by virtue of his office be a
committing magistrate and conduct the preliminary
hearing of a defendant charged with a felony. In the
capacity of committing magistrate, he would not be acting as a judge of the city court or as a justice of the
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peace of a justice's court, but a committing magistrate.
This is obvious when we consider that Section 105-10-5
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides that the following persons may be magistrates:
(1) Justices of the Supreme Court

(2) Judges of the district courts
(3) Judges of city courts
(4) Justices of the peace
Certainly no one can say that a justice of the Supreme
Court, acting as a committing magistrate in a preliminary hearing, is functioning as the Supreme Court. Likewise, a judge of the District Court acting as a committing magistrate does not function as a District Court.
It naturally follows that a judge of a city court or a
justice of the peace acting as a committing magistrate,
does not function as a city court or a justice's court.
As to plaintiff's contention that a committing magistrate is a non-judicial officer and that his function is
ministerial and not judicial, see the following authorities:
16 Corpus Juris 319, paragraph 568:
"THE POWER TO EXAMINE AND TO
COMMIT PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIME
IS NOT JUDICIAL BUT IS ONE OF THE
DUTIES OF THE CONSERVATORS OF THE
PEACE, AND IT MAY BE, AND USUALLY
IS, VESTED IN PERSONS OTHER THAN
COURTS, AS FOR INSTANCE, JUSTICES OF
THE PEACE OR POLICE MAGISTRATES,
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OR PERSONS EXERCISING JURISDICTION
ANALOGOUS TO THAT EXERCISED BY
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, OR WHO ARE
EX OFFICIO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE,
SUCH AS MAYORS, NOTARIES PUBLIC, OR
COURT COMMISSIONERS. Power to hold
preliminary examinations may be exercised by
United States Commissioners, and United States
district judges, who, while taking the preliminary examination, exercise the powers of commissioners only. Where the examination is transferred by the commissioner before whom the warrant .is returnable to another commissioner in the
same district, the latter has jurisdiction to take
the examination and to commit defendant, if the
charge is sustained.'' (See cases therein cited.)
16 Corpus Juris, page 320, paragraph 569:
"In some states, by statute, power to conduct
preliminary examinations is conferred upon
judges of the higher courts. IT HAS BEEN
HELD THAT, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE
POvVERS PERTAINING TO HIS JUDICIAL
OFFICE, A JUDGE WHEN EXERCISING
THE .B"'UNCTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE IN
CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION HAS ONLY THE JURISDICTION AND
POWER CONFERRED BY LAW UPON MAGISTRATES."
People vs. Cohen, 118 Cal. 74, 50 Pac. 20:
''A superior judge, when sitting as a magistrate, possesses no other or greater powers than
are possessed by any other officer exercising the
functions of a magistrate. The justices of this
court, judges of the superior courts, justices of
the peace and police magistrates in cities and
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towns are each and all by the statute made magistrates. (Pen. Code, Sec. 808.) The office is pmely a statutory one, and the powers and duties of
the functionary are solely those given by the
statute; and those powers are precisely the same
whether exercised by virtue of one office, or that
of another. The statute makes no sort of distinction between them. IF A JUDGE OF A SUPERIOR COURT, OH A JUSTICE OF THIS
COURT, SEES FIT TO ASSUME THE DUTIES OF A COMMITTING MAGISTRATEDUTIES \VI--IICH ARE USUALLY PERFORMED BY OTHERS-HE HAS NO GREATER
AUTHORITY AS SUCH MAGISTRATE THAN
THAT POSSESSED BY ANY JUSTICE OF
THE PEACE OR POLICE JUDGE. (People vs.
Crespi, 115 Cal. 50, 46 P. 863). HE IS NOT ACCOMPANIED IN THE DISCHARGE OF
THOSE FUNCTIONS BY ANY OF THE GENERAL OR IMPLIED PUWERS, NOR BY
THOSE PRESUMPTIONS OF REGULARITY
OF HIS PROCEEDINGS, WHICH SURROUND
HIM \VHEN SITTING AS A JUDGE OF A
COURT OF RECORD. AS SUCH MAGISTRATE HE IS PURELY A CREATURE OF
THE STATUTE. vVHILE SITTING AS Pl_
MAGISTRATE, THEN, A JUDGE OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT WOULD HAVE NO MORE
RIGHT TO CALL IN THE COUNTY CLERK
OR ANY OTHER OFFICER TO ADMINISTER
OATHS BEFORE HIM THAN ~WOULD A .JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OR POLICE .JUDGE.
NOR WOULD THE COUNTY CLERK OR HIS
DEPUTIES, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS, HAVE
ANY MORE RIGHT TO PERFORM THAT
FUNCTION BEFORE SUCH JUDGE SITTING
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AS A MAGISTRATE THAN BEFORE A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, NOR COULD THEY
BE REQUIRED TO DO SO IN THE ONE INSTANCE MORE THAN THE OTHER."
It is apparent that J. Allan Crockett in his affidavit
attempts to set forth on information and belief, that R,
Verne McCullough was guilty of contempt of the authority of the city court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, by disobedience and resistance to
the executions of the lawful orders of the said city court
of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
rendered by Judge B. P. Leverich in the contempt case,
:3et forth that the contempt charged was the disobedience
and resistance to the executions of the lawful orders of
the City Court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. Plaintiff contends that no lawful orders
were ever, or could be made by the city court of Salt Lake
City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the matter pertaining to the prosecution of Harry E. Erickson for the
felonious crime of carnal knowledge; that if any lawful
orders were made in said prosecution, the only person
who could make them would be the committing magistrate. The fact that Judge B. P. Leverich had dual capacity to officiate as the judge of the city court of Salt
Lake City or the justice of the peace of the justice's
court of Salt Lake City Precinct, would not give any
validity to orders of the said B. P. Leverich as city
judge of the city court of Salt Lake City or justice of
the peace of the justice's court of Salt Lake City Pre-
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cinct, effecting criminal proceedings for the prosecution
of a felony before B. P. Leverich, committing magistrate.
If this contention is correct, the only orders which R.
Verne McCullough could be guilty of contempt in resisting and disobeying in the prosecution of Harry E.
Erickson, would be the valid orders issued by B. P. Leverich, committing magistrate. Plaintiff contends that
the entire contempt proceedings are erroneously based
upon void orders of B. P. Leverich while acting as city
judge of the city court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. This is obvious for the reason
that the city court of Salt Lake City did not and could
not have jurisdiction of the prosecution of Harry E.
Erickson for the felonious crime of carnal knowledge.
PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT A COMMITTING MAGISTRATE HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH OR AT COMMON LAW TO FINE AND IMPRISON FOR CONTEMPT.
See Farnham vs. Colman, 19 South Dakota 342. The
Court quotes from In Re Mason (D. C.) 43 Fed. 510, as
follows:
"Although the Recorder of the City of Hoboken, New Jersey, had all the powers that justices of the peace throughout the state possessed
as committing magistrates, the court, in discharging on habeas corpus a prisoner found_ guilty of
contempt, employs the following langnagP:
'' 'To punish by a commitment for contt-mpt
is a power belonging only to judges of cPrtain
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courts, and does not arise from the men~ exerciS('
of judicial functions. The power is gre1:1J and its
exercise without review, where there i.o; jurisdiction, and hence, our duty to be careful not to extend it beyond the recognized bounds of the common law. That power, as far as it may be exercised by judicial officer, is an incident to a conrt
belonging alike to courts of civil and criminal
jurisdict:ion, but not extending at common law below such as are courts of record recognized in
the common law. The general doctrine of the
English law is that all courts of record may fine
or imprison for contempt in the face of the court.
And as early as Griesley's case (8 Coke 38), it
was resolved, in the Common Pleas, that courts
which are not of record cannot impose a fine or
commit any persons to prison for contempt. A
power to fine or imprison in such cases, although
necessary for the proper discharge of the duti\•s
of a court not of an inferior jurisdiction, and for
the maintenance of its independence and dignity,
should not belong to all persons, bodies or tribunals who may have a judicial duty to perform.
The Common law wisely did not recognize it in
courts below those of record; and we shc,uld be
doing violence to the liberty of the citizen to encourage its existence in any of our own cc.urtE',
except that, in their very nature, or from analogy
to their English models, or in their constitution,
are courts of record, with jurisdictions not beneath the character of those so treated in the
common law'."
In the Farnham vs. Colman case, the court held that
a United States Court Commissioner, sitting as a committing magistrate, had no power under the laws of
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Minnesota, to punish a witness for contempt. Judge
Nelson said:

"It is claimed by counsel that the puwer to
examine gives the right to subpoena witnesses,
and, as an incident to it, the power to enforce
obedience to the subpoena by arrest and punishment for contempt. To arrest and punish for contempt, is the highest exercise of judicial power
and belongs to ju,dges of courts of record or SU'perior courts. Where jurisdiction exists there
can be no review. A pardon by the executive is
in most cases the mode of release. This power is
not, and never has been an incident to the mere
exercise of judicial function, and such power cannot be upheld upon inference and implication, but
must be expressly conferred by law. There is authority of the courts of the United States directly
upon the question. In Re Perkins, on habeas corpus, before the circuit court, Judge Gresham, the
particular question raised here was decided. Judge
Gresham said:
" 'It is a stretch of language to say that the
punishment of a witness for contempt, and by a
commissioner, is a necessary part of the usual
mode of process against offenders or essential to
the exercise of any powers conferred on him by
the Federal law'."
In the matter of George N. Farnham, 8 Michigan 89,
the Court held the authority to commit for contempt is
not an authority or power incident to the office of the
committing magistrate, or to the authority otherwise
conferred upon the justice of the peace in that capacity.
He has only such powers as are expressly conferred.
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In the matter of Peter Kerrigan on Habeas Corpus,
33 New Jersey Law, 344, the court held:
''Magistrates and others, empo·wered to fine
and imprison in a summary way, are judges of
record quo ad hoc, and their judgments and convictions should be recorded. Such recording may
have the conclusive effect of protecting them in
their judicial action, but will not raise these tribunals to the dignity of common law courts of
record.''
The Court said on page 349:
''The powers of the Justice of the Peace were
orig.inally ministerial entirely (Schroeder vs. Ehlers, 2 Vroom 145), consisting chiefly in preserving the peace, receiving complaints, issuing summons or warrants, taking the examination of witnesses and of the informant, binding them over,
and bailing or committing the accused, 5 Black
354. In the discharge of all his ministerial duties
I can find no English case that directly establishes
a right to punish for contempt.''
In the Whitcomb case, 120 Mass. 118, 21 Am. Rep.
502, the Court held:
"The power to punish for contempt is undoubtedly a judicial power, and therefore statutes undertaking to vest it in tribunals which
are not judicial, must be unconstitutional."
See Haugley vs. Ryan, 182 Mo. 349; 81 S. W. 435.
Sec. 104-78-1 to 104-78-5, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, define con tempts in justice's courts.
Sec. 104-45-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, enum-

134
erates acts and omissions constituting contempts in the
District Court.
Sec. 20-4-29, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides that:
''In all. criminal trials and proceedings in
the city courts, the procedure and practice shall
conform as nearly as may be to that prescribed
by law for justice's courts."

In no place in the Utah Statute is authority given to
a committing magistrate to fine and punish for contempt.
At common law a magistrate had no such authority, and
therefore, plaintiff contends that he could not be guilty
of contempt of any order of B. P. Leverich acting as a
committing magistrate, and any contempt proceedings
arising out of the alleged violation of the orders of said
magistrate would be a mere nullity.
It is a well established doctrine of the law that the
crime of perjury cannot be committed before a court or
tribunal which is act~ng without jurisdiction. An examination of the authorities confirms us in this view. That
queston is annotated at considerable length in 82 L.R.A.,
page 1127.

At page 1128 of that report it is said:
"It is a well established general rule that
perjury cannot be charged on a false oath in a
proceeding before a court which had no jurisdiction to inquire into the matter which is the
subject of that proceeding.''
In support of the rule, cas~s are cited from the Supreme Court of the United States, the District of Co-
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lumbia, Hawaii, England, Canada, and twenty-four states
of the Union. In the absence of statute we have been
unable to find a case to the contrary. At the time the
alleged offense of perjury was committed, our statute
touching the crime of perjury provided:
"Every person, who having taken an oath
that he will testify, declare, depose and certify
truly before any competent tribunal, officer or
person in any of the cases in which such an oath
may by law be administered, wilfully, contrary to
such oath, states as true any material he knows
to be false, is guilty of perjury.'' Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 103-43-1.
That provision is merely declaratory of the common law.
If a court is without jurisdiction of a cause, no evidence
can be material and therefore the contempt proceedings
were a mere nullity. A case or two which are typical of
all the cases, will illustrate the view entertained by the
courts:
In the case of United States vs. Jackson, 20 D. C.
424, it is said:
"We think it is very well settled, the authoritlies seeming to be uniform upon that point, that
when perjury is assigned to have been committed
in a cause of a trial in any court, that the court
in which the trial is held where the perjury is alleged to have been committed, must have jurisclliction of the action or prosecution in which the
oath was taken, and that unless the Court had
jurisdiction to try and dispose of the case, perjury cannot be assigned.''
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In the case of McClannohan vs. Conn, 11 Kentucky
Appeals, 72, it is said:
"The administration of an oath in a case
over which the court has no jurisdiction is \~ke
every other part of the proceedings, a mere nullity, the judge having no more power to administer than he would on the street where no purpose was to be accomplished by it nor any oath
required.''
Such are the authorities generally.
Plaintiff further contends that the affidavit of J.
Allan Crockett, filed in the contempt proceedings, is
fatally defective and did not give the court jurisdiction
in said cause. The affidavit of said J. Allan Crockett
is based entirely upon information and belief. Plaintiff
contends that in a case of constructive contempt a court
cannot proceed except by an accusation in writing setting forth the facts constituting the contempt in a positive manner by someone conversant therewith; that the
jurisdiction of the court is predicated upon such an affidavit. The following authorities are in point that the
insufficiency of the affidavit is jurisdictional and not
mere error:
Nichols vs. State (Okl), 129 Pac. 673:
''The Court not having any personal knowledge of the facts, cannot proceed except by an
accusa~'ion in writing under oath, specifically
charging the facts constituting the violation.''
Phillips Sheet and Tin Plate Co. vs. Workers, 208
Fed. 335, at page 344:
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"The charging paper (petition, motion or
affidavit), on a proceeding for contempt must
not be defective in substance but must show on
its face, sufficient facts to const.itute a contempt
and to justify the relief sought and must also
have an appropriate prayer, and the defects in
such respects are jurisdictional and not waived
by the accused by going to trial without objection."
Mitchell vs. Superior Court, 125 Pac. 1061 at 1062;
163 Cal. 423:
''The affidavit or affidavits upon which a
contempt proceeding is based, constitute the complaint; and, unless they upon their face, charge
acts constituting contempt, the court is without
jurisdiction to proceed.''
·
Hutton vs. Superior Court, 81 Pac. 409; 147 Cal. 159:
"Where a contempt ;is committed without the
presence of the court, the affidavit of facts constituting the complaint, is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court to punish the defendant
unless it shows a case of contempt on ~ts face.
Writ of certiorari will lie to test jurisdict'ion."
Coulter vs. People, 53 California, 123 Pac. 647:
"If the affidavit upon which proceedings to
punish for contempt are based fails to allege facts
which, if true, constitute a contempt, jurisdiction
is not acquired."
Rapalje on Con tempts, Section 94:
"It is elementary that if the affidavit or
complaint upon which contempt proceedings are
based, is defective in substance, that is, fails to
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allege facts which, if true, will constitute contempt in law, the court will not acquire jurisdiction, and if the court proceeds, its judgment will
be reversed.''
In the case of Emeline A. Young et al vs. George
Q. Cannon et al., 2 Utah, page 560, the Court held: In
all proceedings for contempt, which are not committed
in the presence of the Court, in order to give the Court
jurisdiction, it is necessary that an affidavit be filed,
stating the facts constituting the contempt. The Court
said on page 594 :
"It will not do to state in the affidavit in
general terms a conclusion of law, that the party
has been gu':ilty of a disobedience to the order of
the court, or be in such indefinite form as not to
show a particular or a series of particular disobediences. It must state the particular act or
acts of disobedience, and in such clear and unmistakable language that will give to the court
knowledge in what particular or particulars its
order has been disobeyed; that a demand has
been formally made to obey the order in the particular set out in the affidavit, and that the contemnor either refused and declined, or wilfully,
and still does, continue to disobey the order. Unless this particularity is observed in the affidavit,
the court cannot become possessed of the facts
constituting the contempt and showing that its
order has been disobeyed, and the accused will
not be informed of the act or charge to which he
is called upon to answer. No man can b~ deprived
of his liberty or have his property wrested from
him without due process of law, and the court
cannot derive that jurisdiction over the matter,
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which it is necessary for it to have to enforce its
orders, without the law has been complied with
strictly and in the manner pointed out by the
statute."
PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT AN AFFIDAVIT ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF IS OF NO
VALUE WHATSOEVER AND CITES THE FOLLOWING AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF HIS
CONTENTION:
6 Ruling Case Law, page 532, cites the general rule:
"While an instance is given where an accusation was deemed sufficient, though only on information and belief (Emery vs. State (Neb.)
111 N. W. 374), IT IS THE RULE IN MOST
JURISDICTIONS THAT SUCH AN AFFIDAVIT IS -WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT UPON
-WHICH TO BASE CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AND THAT NO JURISDICTION CAN BE ACQUIRED BY THE
COURT THEREUNDER.''
Plaintiff contends that the Nebraska case of Emery
vs. State, cited by the author of Ruling Case Law as an
exception to the general rule, does not support the exception for the reason that the Court held on page 374
.in Volume 111 of the Northwestern Reporter, that the
charge of contempt was set forth in positive and direct
terms but that the prosecutor in his verification stated
that the allegations and charges contained in said information were within his information, and that he verily
believed them to be true. The Court held that such defect in the verification of the information was waived by
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the filing of the answer and entering a plea of not guilty
and proceeding to trial.
Belangee vs. State, (Neb.) 149 N. W. 415:
''An affidavit alleging material facts on information and belief does not give a court jurisdiction of a contempt proceeding.''
Hurdman vs. State, 54 Neb. 626:
"The affidavit in contempt proceedings is
jurisdictional. The statement must be of the personal knowledge of the affiant. It may not be on
information and belief.''
Ex parte Fullen, 17 N. M. 394; 128 Pac. 64:
''A constructive contempt must be brought
to the court's notice by affidavit. This affidavit
must state facts which if established, would constitute a contempt; and if it does not do so, the
court is without jurisdiction to proceed.''
This case arose on a writ of habeas corpus and the
judge delivering the opinion of the Court said:
''The overwhelming weight of authority in
this country sustains the proposition that the affidavit upon which the proceeding for a constructive contempt is based, must state facts, which, if
established, would constitute the offense, and if
the allegations of the affidavit are not sufficient
in this respect, the court is without jurisdiction
to proceed.''
State vs. Sweetland, 3 S.D. 503; 54 N. W. 415:
''In a proceeding for constructive contempt,
the affidavit on which the proceeding is based,
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is jurisdictional and all the facts showing that
the case is one over which the court has jurisdiction, must be made to affirmatively appear by
the affidavit.''
Early vs. People, 117 Ill. App. 608:
''A petition filed in a contempt proceeding
should be certain in every essential particular
and should show facts which, if proven, will establish the contempt alleged, and where based
merely upon the belief of the petitioner, it is insufficient.''
State vs. Gallup, 1 Kans. App. 618; 42 Pac. 406:
"An affidavit which only states that informatiton has come to the county attorney that a
person has committed a contempt, is fatally defective.''
Russell vs. Mandell, Circuit Judge, 136 Mich. 624;
99 N. W. 864:
"Allegations in the petition not supported
by the affidavits will be ignored. When one
charges another with the serious crime of interfering with the due course of justice by corrupting or intimidating witnesses, he must have positive evidence to present to the court upon which
to base the charge. Rumors will not do. Allegations upon information and belief are not sufficient to put the party charged upon answer."
(Case arose on writ of mandamus.)
State vs. Newton, 16 North Dakota 151; 14 Am. and
English Annotated Cases 1035:
"An affidavit upon information and belief
is insufficient as a basis for constructive con-
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tempt proceedings, and under such an affidavit
the court acquires no jurisdiction to issue an attachment for contempt."
See Note in 14 Am. and Eng. Ann. Cases 1042:

"In a majority of jurisdictions, the affidavit
filed as the basis of a proceeding to punish for a
contempt not committed in the presence of the
court, must stat.e positive knowledge. If upon information and belief, insufficient." (See cases
cited therein.)
Ludden vs. State, 48 N. W. 61 (Nebraska):
"The charge must be direct, that the party
has committed the act complained of. In all matters based upon the oath of a party charging another with the commission of an offense, by
which he may be deprived of his liberty, the
charge must be specific and direct, mere hearsay
will not do.''
St. Amant vs. Beixcodin, 5 N. Y. Super. 703.
State vs. Newton, 112 N. W. 52, (North Dakota):
"In constructive criminal contempt proceedings, a formal accusation is essential, and such
accusation takes the place of an indictment or information in a criminal case, and must be tested
by the same rules applicable to indictments and
informations.''

''We take it to be equally well settled that
such an accusation must state the facts tending
to show the defendant's guilt, by positive averments, and that a statement of such facts on information and belief, renders such accusations a
mere nullity, and confers no jurisdiction upon the
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court to entertain the contempt proceedings or to
r·ender judgment therein."

State vs. Conn, 62 Pac. 289 (Oregon):
"The facts constituting the contempt shall be
stated in a positive manner by someone conversant therewith. Indeed, a proper regard for the
liberty of the citizen forbids any proceeding by
which he nwy be deprived of his liberty without
the iuforrnation f~trnished by such an affidavit."

Freedman vs. Huron, 66 N. W. 928, (South Dakota):
''Persons Rhould not be required to accept
an essentially criminal charge based merely upon
tlH~ belief of a prosecutor."
Ex parte Landry, 144 S. \V. 962 (Texas).
JUDGE B. P. LEVERICH ACTING AS COMMITTING MAGISTRATE IN THE PROSECUTION OF
THE CRIMINAL CASE OF THE" STATE OF UTAH
VS. HARRY E. ERICKSON," \VAS BOUND BY LA·w
TO DISMISS SAID ACTION WHEN THE COUNTY
ATTORNEY MADE A MOTION THAT THE ACTION
BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE AS
SHO\VN BY THE COURT RECORDS IN SAID ACTION AND BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
JUDGMENT RENDERED IN THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST R. VERNE McCULLOUGH.
Plaintiff contends that Judge B. P. Leverich had
no right to refuse to dismiss the case when the motion
to dismiss was made by the prosecuting officer. This
doctrine is clearly established in the common law and
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in absence of statutory authority giving the committing
magistrate discretionary power in such matters, the
motion to dismiss on the part of the prosecuting officer
ended the case. The follovYing authorities are in point:
"The weight of authnrity is to the effeet
that, in the absenec of a statute on the subject,
the entering of a nolle prosequi bc~fore the jury
have been impaneled and sworn lies in the sole
discretion of the pro scenting officer.''

22 R. C. L. 97
16 c. J. 432.
"Publie prosecutions, until they eoPw lwfore
the court to which they are returnable, are within
the exchtsive direction of the district attorucy and
even after they are entered in court, they are so
far under his control that he 1nay enter a nolle
prosequi at any time before the :i1try is impaneled
for the trial of the case except 'in cases 1.uhere it
is otherwise provided in some act of Conr;ress . ..
Under the rules of the eonnnon laY·.', it must be
conceded that the prosecuting party may rdi:1quish his suit at any stage or it, and withdraw
from court at his option, and without otlwr liability to his adversary than the paynwnt of taxable costs whieh have acerued up to the time
when he withdraws his suit.''
Confiseation cases.
19 U. S. (L. Ed.) 19G.
In prosecution for perjury it must appear that the
alleged false testimony was on a material point.
Obviously no testimony could be material unless
some issue was then properly before the Court.
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Committing Magistrate D. P. Leverich ·was, upon
motion of the County Attorney, bound to dismiss the
criminal prosecution of Erickson. Under the maxim that
equity considers that as done which ought to be done,
the motion to dismiss virtually did away w:ith the criminal prosecution of Erickson.

That being so, defendant could not properly be cited
before the Court on a contempt proceedin,g for things
which occurred after the motion to dismiss was made;
it would necessarily follow, for that reason, that whatever testimony the defendant gave in the contempt proCPedings could not be material because no matter was
then pending "before any competent tribunal," as provided by the definition of perjury. (See. 103-43-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933).
In f'onclusion, plaintiff makes no appeal for any unmerited ::;ympathy from your Honorable Court. For two
years :M eCnllough has face.d charge after charge before
committing magistrates, courts and commissions. Evidence, requiring over 2500 pages of transcript, has been
g~1then~d throughout the United States. Thousands of
dollars have been spent hy plaintiff for transcripts, vvitnPss fees and eourt (~Xpcnscs. Newspapers throughout
the State of Utah and adjoining states, including the
Utah State Bar Bulletin, have lmmereifully publicized
these procceuinr;~;. 1lcCullonr;h 's law practice has been
irreparably ruirwd. He is fighting for a final vindication of his standing as a la-wyer before your Honorable
Court and as a eitizen of the State of Utah.
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vV e sincerely concur in the following statement of
Bakewell, Justice of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in
State vs. Laughl:in, 10 Mo. App. loc. cit. 6, cited by ~Weeks
on Attorneys at Law, Sec. 80, page 140:
"The power to disbar an attorney ought to
be exercised with the greatest caution, not as a
means of punishment, and only in extreme cases;
for the decision of a court disbarring one of its
attorneys must have the most dreadful effect upon the social standing and future position of the
unhappy man disbarred. The power should only
be exerc.ised where the delinquent has shown himself utterly unfit to be a member of an honorable
profession and an officer of the court.''
Respectfully submitted,

R. VERNE McCULLOUGH,
Plaintiff,
ELIAS HANSEN,
HENRY D. MOYLE,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

